Suwalki Gap Revisited

By Manolis Skoulikas

In 2019, Poland executed a strategic simulation with the following scenario: In order to counter an asymmetric attack with massive waves of instrumentalized migrants from its eastern border, Poland invades Belarus. At the same time, Russia is also entering Belarus to “protect” it and the war is generalizing between the three countries. In this scenario, based on its forces and doctrine at that time, Russia had captured Warsaw in 15 days from the start of operations. Following this realization, Poland decided to double its army within the next few years. It has not yet succeeded but has taken very serious steps in this direction. Of course, we are not sure how much its operational doctrine has been adapted to reflect the cataclysmic changes that the war in Ukraine has brought about in the way the war is conducted. From a recent unfortunate attempt to train Ukrainian recruits, it seems that it has not correctly reflected these changes, neither in its doctrine nor in the equipment of its units. On the contrary, the Russians have developed new tactics and strategic approaches that prove to be quite effective in the field, while in fact, with these tactics, they succeed in having much less casualties even as aggressors.

The three Baltic republics respectively have tried to prepare for a very likely Russian invasion and their few soldiers seem to be quite combat-ready and with very high morale, which is justified if we consider the past experience that these countries have with Russian domination. Yet, in a study by the Rand Corporation think tank in 2018, an established authority on strategic simulations in the Western World, the Baltic republics will not be able to withstand more than 48 hours in a Russian attack. Within this time, NATO’s rapid intervention forces, and any additional ones from the US, will not be able to turn the situation around, except on the condition of early warning of the Russian attack several days – if not weeks – in advance. The two airborne U.S. superdivisions — the 101st and 82nd — would be enough to give a few days to the Baltic resistance, but in exchange for significant losses in two U.S. units that spearhead their influence around the planet. With the threat of Taiwan looming ever closer on the horizon, after the removal of Chang Youxia, the US is unlikely to involve both superdivisions – or even one of them – in the Baltics, which is considered a losing game. In such a case, NATO forces will not have the time to prevent the occupation of the Baltic Republics by the Russians within the critical period of the first two days.

An important stake, however, for the capture of the Baltic Republics is the capture of the “Suwalki Gap”. This is the space between Belarus and Kaliningrad, an 80-kilometer span, which if captured, effects a ground blockade of the Baltic Republics and their NATO Allies will have to wage an aggressive – and therefore costly – struggle to open the reinforcement and supply lines to them. Of course, the attack of the Russians will not take place in the more strongly guarded Polish territories, but in the weaker Lithuanian territories and the achievement of a strategic surprise will be necessary for the immediate occupation of the Gap. Also, in order to occupy the Baltic Republics, it is necessary to immediately occupy their ports and airports to prevent reinforcements from coming in. As well as to occupy the islands of Bornholm (Denmark) and Jutland (Sweden) which control the entrance to the Baltic Sea, without the control of which the NATO navy will not be able to supply the defenders of the Baltic Republics with troops and equipment, nor attack the Russian forces with ballistic missiles. Of course, the air defense and ballistic missiles of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, between Poland and the Baltics, are capable of intercepting several of these missiles and satisfactorily controlling the Baltic Sea for a period of time. Of course, it is neither able to hold out forever against an attack by Poland, nor does it have an unlimited supply of missiles -hence the need of establishing a supply route by the occupation of the Suwalki Gap. But the damage it can cause to airports, ports, infrastructure and NATO air and naval units is difficult for hypersensitive Western societies to tolerate, who will try to occupy it immediately at the start of hostilities. Therefore, Kaliningrad’s connection to Belarus, through the Suwalki Gap, is of the utmost importance to Russia.

Yet, are things as favorable for Russia as they seem to be presented by Western analytical centers? Is Russia’s intervention almost certain after Ukraine’s war in the Baltics and possibly in Northern Scandinavia as well? Is the expansion of the war strategically useful? Is direct occupation tactically possible? Let’s try to answer these questions, equipped as we are now, with the experience of the last four years of the war in Ukraine.

First of all, it should be noted that the use of unmanned vehicles on the battlefield has radically changed the way of fighting. Not only is it easy to locate the opponent immediately, but the enemy can also be neutralized en masse by these means. Massive attacks by combined arms – motorized infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation, with the possible participation of airborne units – were the undisputed offensive doctrine at the start of the War in Ukraine. Overnight, they became suicidal desperate absurdities, and even if an ignorant officer makes the mistake of ordering such attacks, most veteran soldiers will not even execute them. Now, small groups of motorcyclists (2-3 Moto-Cross bikes with one or two soldiers each and enough supplies) quickly penetrate into a settlement, consolidate a makeshift bridgehead, cover and coordinate the advance of the rest of their unit. Artillery and drones cover the advance, while special units comprised of seven specialists, armed with repeating smooth-bore carbines and electronic jamming equipment, cover the advance from aerial drones’ attacks. The only defense against enemy artillery or drones is the rapid advance or retreat and cover in basements, especially of large apartment buildings, where shells do not pierce all floors. Field fortifications no longer protect against drones, which can only be dealt with by strong shelters (blindages), reinforced with cement from above and net covered entrances covered for several meters. Tanks are now targets and have ended up being used as assault artillery, firing only direct shots from long distances at enemy fortified positions. Armored Combat and Personnel Carrier vehicles can no longer operate safely, transporting motorized infantry directly up to enemy positions because they immediately become prey to the enemy’s attack drones. Now they have become simple means of transport that are content to transport the infantry from the rear to an advanced position near the enemy positions, from where each soldier moves on foot to the line of contact, taking care to keep a long distance from his colleagues (15-30 meters) so as not to become a target of artillery or drones.

As the failed airborne attack on Kyiv airport, in 2022, showed, an airborne attack against a well-prepared defense position, with security personnel, aptly equipped and organized, is no longer possible to succeed, and the widespread surveillance of the modern battlefield, combined with the now widespread use of portable anti-aircraft missiles and attack drones, makes the use of transport planes and helicopters prohibitive. On the contrary, there is an increase in covert infiltrations such as through a gas pipeline in Kursk, with slow hikes in Pokrovsk, or even under civilian disguise, as in the special Ukrainian operation against Russian airports.

Given these lessons, the predictions of military analysts must be revised. The capture of the airports and ports of the Baltic republics, as well as the islands of Jutland and Bornholm will no longer be an easy task as the airborne forces will be in grave danger of being shot down before they even land and the special forces that will have infiltrated the interior will not be enough to achieve all the required objectives. So, even if only a few airports remain operational, they will be able to accommodate NATO and US rapid reaction forces. Of course, Russia’s ever-growing ballistic missile arsenal will be able to make up for some of this. But landing on the Baltic islands will prove very difficult if no tactical surprise can be achieved. The advances of the Russians in the Suwalki Gap, and especially in the territories of the Baltic Republics, will not be as lightning-fast as predicted by Rand, since, as it turned out in the first weeks of the war in Ukraine, an army that does not seek to keep solid lines of defense but delays the opponent with a “liquid” defense of fortified locations at central nodes and constant ambushes and raids in the rear of its communications, can overcome any 20th century offensive doctrine such as the one used in the Rand simulation, based on the extensive wear and tear of the enemy’s armored vehicles and supply lines. Infantry advances are no longer massive nor fast, so time will no longer play in the Russians’ favor unless they are willing to suffer disproportionate losses and therefore counter any upcoming NATO counterattacks with these heavily depleted units. The involvement of fifth-generation fighters will give NATO a significant advantage since the American F-35s are invisible from all directions and not only (mainly) from the front like their Russian counterparts. In the course of a few days, this difference will have caused the Russian air force to withdraw from the skies of the Baltic Sea in order to avoid asymmetric losses. Clearly, however, the Russian air defense with the S-400 and S-500 will not permit NATO air dominance – perhaps not even air superiority.

Now, as far as the strategic prospect of intervening in the Baltic Republics is concerned, Russia has always considered them as its “near abroad”, and has always coveted them. After the end of the war in Ukraine, Russia will initially have to deal with a crisis with its veterans. These people will begin to experience significant problems with PTSD after 6-12 months after the end of the war and their removal from the front. This will mean huge rates of alcoholism, drug addiction, violent delinquency, suicides and the widespread formation of criminal gangs. As for any veteran of a long war, reintegration will not be easy, while for many it will be impossible.

From antiquity to the present day, people who are immersed for long periods into the alternative reality of war undergo so many radical neural changes that they can only be reintegrated by a personal feat. The only solution that societies find for these people – apart from social marginalization and incarceration, which are not per se viable solutions – is to use them in a new war, indeed even before they begin to collapse through widespread Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. In this context, if Russia does not want to reduce the performance of its veterans, it will have to resume hostilities within a year, from the end of the war in Ukraine. Also, China’s very likely invasion of Taiwan may also mean the opportunity for the Eurasian bloc to engage the West on two fronts. Either Russia’s previous invasion of the Baltics will put the U.S. in a dilemma about which forces to engage there to defend them, all the while considering the imminent danger for Taiwan, giving Russia the advantage of only partial investment by NATO and more specifically the U.S. in the region. Or in tandem with the landing of Chinese troops in Taiwan and the forced investment of the Americans in the region, Russia will attack the Baltics or even Northern Scandinavia – to secure the northern passage of the Arctic with the Arctic Circle areas, spanning from the Norwegian northern coast to the Svarbald Islands, Iceland and even Greenland – knowing that NATO will not have enough forces to stop it, with the US trapped in the Pacific, while at the same time irreparably exposing the already half-dead North Atlantic Treaty. Here, of course, the issue arises that Xi Jinping, after the recent changes in military leadership, has not yet made the necessary purges in the Chinese Army and these may take more than two years, while, however, the Ukrainian issue is coming to an end, probably within this year.

Will the window of opportunity coincide between the end of the Ukrainian conflict and the one year until the Chinese landing in Taiwan? Given the growing international confrontations, developments are likely to pressure things and this opportunity for the Eurasian bloc will not be overlooked. On the other hand, Xi has not yet completely prevailed inside China and the purges may be very painful and lengthy since the army was largely loyal to its former leader Chang Youzia.

The fact remains that Europe must prepare militarily for this most likely confrontation, but its current very deficient progress, both in armaments and in the formulation of new doctrines and corresponding training and personal equipment, does not bode well for its northeastern borders.