Russia’s continuous loss of influence in Central Asia could complicate its relations with China

By George Lakasas

In the recent days, reports emerged from the Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan that were viewed with a negative connotation in Russia. According to local news media, the President of the country Sadyr Japarov, who has been in office since 2021, stated that his government would implement a policy of remaining various villages that have Russian names.¹ This development comes four years after Japarov signed a law that would allow for the renaming of places from Russian to Kyrgyz.² The stated goal is for the process to be completed by 2027.³ According to the official narrative, the initiative was launched in order to standardize the toponymies of the state by using the Kyrgyz language, remove the Soviet-era place names, and unify the Kyrgyz people.⁴ This change would affect primarily the Russian population living in the Chüy Region and around the state’s capital city, in the north, where the majority of Russian speakers live.⁵

Although the 2021 amended constitution still recognizes the Russian language as an official one across the state,⁶ eighteen new laws that were passed in 2025 regulated and restricted its usage by the citizenry.⁷ This shift from the “imported” Russian language to the local/national ones is not an isolated event in Central Asia. Due to the domination of the Russian language during the Soviet era as the lingua franca and the attempts on Russification, the national languages of the Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs are underdeveloped and have not evolved as other languages have, lacking, among other things, accurate translation of terms and the appropriate definition, making communication difficult.⁸

Phenomena of former Soviet republics decoupling with Russia in the Central Asian region are growing in the recent years. More recently, in March of 2026, a new Constitution was approved by a sham referendum in the Republic of Kazakhstan, in which the wording in regard to the official use of the Russian language was changed, from “equal” to “along” with the Kazakh language.⁹ In the same text, the state’s sovereignty is highlighted, which is perceived to be a codified response to Russia’s claims regarding the questions it has raised on the Kazakh territorial legitimacy.¹⁰

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian-allowed Armenia-Azerbaijan War of 2020 and the followed clashes including the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the fall of the Russian-supported Assad regime in 2024, along with President Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric of undermining the sovereignty of the Central Asian republics have all proven to countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that Moscow is not a reliable partner anymore.

Of course, this process of shifting away from their northern neighbor has its origins in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. But real steps were made after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.¹¹ These republics, viewing Moscow as a neo-imperialist power, have started to approach the People’s Republic of China, which is located to their east. The first China–Central Asia Summit took place in 2023 and the second in 2025. In both summits, Russia was absent.

At this point, the fact that Central Asia is perceived by Russia as its own Near Abroad has to be highlighted. The Near Abroad policy, which is similar in scope to U.S.w’ Monroe Doctrine, outlines that Russia has special privileges in the post-Soviet republics. In Eastern Europe, Moscow has seen that its policy has not been respected by Western powers. Now, in Central Asia, this policy is being undermined by most notably China, a close partner.

Beijing joined the frame after 1991, mainly over its concerns of potential unrest in their Xinjiang province, that would be in cooperation with groups in Central Asia, that promote separatism. ¹² Economic opportunities, nevertheless, also play a big role in Beijing’s strategic thinking. For example, the China National Petroleum Corporation has signed various agreements with countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the past. The CNPC had purchased the Canadian PetroKazakhstan company in 2005, which operates all over Kazakhstan. At the same time, through the Belt and Road Initiative, China is able to deepen its involvement in the economies of the mentioned countries and even swing their negative opinion to a positive one.¹³ There is a plethora of bibliography and scientific study on the subject, but it has to be lastly stated that China presents itself as an equal partner, something that Russia does not do, even if it has an asymmetrical advantage over them.¹⁴

In the end, Russia has little to offer to these countries rather than her need to dominate over them. Moscow has managed to “lock” certain governments of those states, as it can be seen in the various organizations that are Russia-centered/controlled such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union. In reality, Russia cannot compete with the Belt and Road Initiative or the Chinese seemingly vast financial resources that is willing to spend on the region, as it is preoccupied with financing its war in Ukraine. Simultaneously, due to the Western sanctions imposed to it, Moscow has become more dependent on China than ever before. The Russian leadership has to navigate the rising anti-Russian, nationalist sentiments in Central Asia, and in order to sustain its level of control and influence, it must find ways to not undermine or sabotage its relations with China.

References

¹ Zhanbirova, A. (2026, April 15). Kursiv. Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://kz.kursiv.media/en/2026-04-15/engk-nknk-controversy-erupts-in-kyrgyzstan-over-renaming-of-russian-named-villages/amp/

² Kuvatova, A. (2022, January 21). 24.KG. Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://24.kg/english/221318_President_Sadyr_Japarov_signs_law_on_renaming_towns_and_villages/

³ KirTag. (2026, April 14). Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://kyrtag.kg/ru/news/sadyr-zhaparov-k-kontsu-2027-goda-vsem-selam-strany-dadut-kyrgyzskie-nazvaniya

⁴ Mezha. (2026, April 14). Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://mezha.net/eng/bukvy/kyrgyzstan_will_rename/

⁵ Minority Rights. (2018, March). Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://minorityrights.org/communities/russians-and-ukrainians/

⁶ Government of the Kyrgyz Republic. (2021). Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic. Page 3. Article 10. Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://wipolex-res.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/kg/kg084en_1.pdf?last-modified=1721240729&Expires=1776329457&Signature=nff4CfX1nWbVrExQBQ8iPTHwl1mwgDlVTMAhasw1D7qOgpumVz1VH18kkAPjTuxbnzGejZhT5Qb7erGUuEufsFg60aAsBgjqPMGs~qjePoou37A9RGG9NPGMw7TpoelY8~E71

⁷ Chipegin, A. (2025, July 8). The Times of Central Asia. Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://timesca.com/experts-warn-of-rights-violations-in-kyrgyzstans-language-reform-push/

⁸ Fiedorczuk, O. (2026, February 20). The Times of Central Asia. Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://timesca.com/the-language-nobody-wants-to-speak-about-russians-uneasy-place-in-central-asias-cultural-conversation/

⁹ Kurmangazinova, N. (2026, February 9). BLACTb. Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://vlast.kz/novosti/68303-v-proekte-novoj-konstitucii-izmenili-formulirovku-ob-ispolzovanii-russkogo-azyka.html

¹⁰ Eurasianet. (2026, March 12). Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://eurasianet.org/kazakhstan-constitutional-referendum-fact-sheet

¹¹ Blank, S. (2014, May 27). The Diplomat. Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://thediplomat.com/2014/05/what-crimea-teaches-central-asia/

¹² Yamaguchi, S. (2026, January 22). China’s diplomacy in Central Asia: the logic of internal politics coupled with the logic of great power competition. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, p. 2. Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/epdf/10.1080/24761028.2026.2619803?needAccess=true

¹³ Vakulchuk, R., & Overland, I. (2019). China’s Belt and Road Initiative through the lens of Central Asia. In F. M. Cheung, & Y.-y. Hong (Eds.), Regional Connection under the Belt and Road Initiative: The Prospects for Economic and Financial Cooperation. Routledge. Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329310641_China%27s_Belt_and_Road_Initiative_through_the_lens_of_Central_Asia

¹⁴ Kassenova, N. (2022, December 7). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved April 16, 2026, from https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/12/how-chinas-foreign-aid-fosters-social-bonds-with-central-asian-ruling-elites?center=china&lang=en