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By George Lakasas
It is no speculation anymore that Poland is steadily upgrading its status in the European continent as a military power. Ever since the turning point in history that is the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Warsaw has taken rapid measures to ensure its state’s survival and security in a continuously unstable environment. Nevertheless, the foundations of this militarization process predate 2022, having already been shaped by earlier geopolitical developments, particularly the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and the European Union-Belarus border crisis of 2021, which saw the direct systematic weaponization of immigrants against the sovereignty of Poland and the Baltic states.
Domestically, the subject of rearmament of the Polish state has been met with bipartisan support, and as a policy, it was initiated by the right-wing Law and Justice government and continued by the more liberal center-right Civic Coalition administration. This continuity illustrates the existence of a relatively stable strategic consensus within the Polish political sphere, regarding the perception of Russia.
A decisive institutional step in the process was the adoption of the Homeland Defense Act of 2022, announced just one day after the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, declared the deployment of Russian troops to Donetsk and Luhansk, on February 21. The Act had at its focus the increase of military spending and the expansion of the armed forces.1 As of 2026, the goal of expanding the defense budget has been met, with Poland allocating at least 4.5% of its capital, thereby becoming one of NATO’s highest military spenders.2
In May of 2024, Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced the “National Deterrence and Defense Programme” colloquially known as the “East Shield” initiative.3 The goal of the initiative is to fortify the borders of Poland with Belarus and Russia and is set for completion by 2028. The project is part of a wider initiative to fortify EU’s and NATO’s eastern border, along with the Baltic Defense Line, and protect the Suwałki Gap.4
On May 1st of this year, U.S. President Donald Trump, ordered the withdrawal of 5.000 troops from Germany. Although the decision itself seems to have been influenced by the comments made by the German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, in regard to the US-Israel war against Iran,5 speculation quickly arose about the potential stationing of those troops to another NATO country, rather than their transfer back to the States. Potential hosting countries mentioned were the Baltics, Poland and Romania.6 On May 22nd, Trump himself declared that the troops would go to Poland, mentioning his close ties with Polish President, Karol Nawrocki, as one of the reasons he agreed upon this decision.7
In general, ever since his re-election, Trump has politicized the American troops in Europe and uses them as leverage for expanding his influence and interests in the continent. Trump’s decision seems to be undermining his relations with Russia. Moscow expected Trump to pull troops away from Europe, not bring them closer to its borders. This factor could play a role on incoming negotiations about peace in Ukraine.
Although the Russian rhetoric against Poland indicates hostility, thus justifying the military expansion, historical memory and collective trauma constitute significant factors shaping Polish strategic culture and security decision-making. Poland’s historical experiences of partition, foreign occupation, wartime devastation and Soviet domination have contributed to a persistent perception of geopolitical vulnerability within both political elites and the broader society. An American buildup in the country can translate to some as direct help to the Poles and ease their fears.
References
1 The Chancellery of the Prime Minister. (2022, February 22). Retrieved May 26, 2026, from www.gov.pl: https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/more-troops-and-more-money-for-defence–the-council-of-ministers-adopted-a-draft-homeland-defence-act
2 Public Diplomacy Division. (2025). Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2025). p. 9. Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved May 26, 2026, from https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/finance/def-exp-2025-en.pdf
3 The Chancellery of the Prime Minister. (2024, May 18). Retrieved May 26, 2026, from www.gov.pl: https://www.gov.pl/web/primeminister/East-Shield
4 Gaszewski, S. (2025). Poland’s East Shield: A comprehensive approach to secure NATO’s Eastern Flank. Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Retrieved May 26, 2026, from https://www.kas.de/documents/252038/33607021/Poland’s_East_Shield.pdf/cf78907b-22d5-7956-b39f-fe15809c1f5e?version=1.0&t=1755113735765
5 Timotija, F. (2026, May 1). The Hill. Retrieved May 26, 2026, from thehill.com: https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5860094-trump-orders-troop-withdrawal-germany/
6 Vandiver, J. (2026, May 3). Stars and Stripes. Retrieved May 26, 2026, from www.stripes.com: https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2026-05-03/germany-trump-troop-cuts-21561959.html
7 Finley, B., & Lee, M. (2026, May 22). Associated Press. Retrieved May 26, 2026, from apnews.com: https://apnews.com/article/trump-troops-withdrawal-germany-poland-europe-499a39701275a553d1ff15bb1756d2fe