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An Analysis of the Political Situation in Bangladesh: A Democratic Revolution for Nothing?

Bangladesh Revolution

By George Lakasas

With the world being focused on the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Israeli invasion of Gaza and the U.S. Presidential election, in July of 2024 the rising dissatisfaction towards the sociopolitical status quo in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh led to a popular uprising, resulting in the successful overthrowing of the government. In a country of 170 million people, the revolution was headed primarily by young university students, who had been experiencing corruption and authoritarianism during their entire lives. The democratic conditions in the country were not desirable to the young people1, with the NGO Freedom House, placing it in a score of 40/100 on its index2. A democratic revolution had occurred in Asia and went rather unnoticed by the Western world. The people were dissatisfied with the status quo and were led to such actions.

Since 1991, the political life of Bangladesh has been dominated by two political parties: the People’s League and the Nationalist Party. Both are considered to be “big tent” parties, with the first representing the left side of the political spectrum and urban areas, and the second representing the right side of the spectrum and rural areas3. A third option exists, the Islamic Congress, which attracts a considerable amount of the population. According to the U.S. Department of State, democracy in the country is considered important, due to the war of independence, but lacks solid foundations4. Before 2024, the People’s League, which had been governing continuously since 2009, seemed to have been in a position to accumulate more power and steadily eliminate threats to its rule5.

The spark that ignited the mass unrest was the decision made by the Supreme Court of the country to re-instate the pre-2018 quota system for the public sector. Essentially, the quota system is a state policy that ensures the participation of the descendants of the military personnel, who fought during the 1971 war for independence against Pakistan, in the public sector, reserving specific percentages of jobs for them. Other parts of society also had secured job opportunities, but the main issue was the perpetuation of nepotism and anti-meritocracy phenomena, thus inequalities. The quota system effectively created a closed group of citizens, aiming at keeping their privileged positions6. The students feared that in a country with very few good jobs, opportunities should be based mainly on merit, not family history.

Although the government complied with the demand of the students to modify the quota system, the violence against them led to hundreds of deaths and thousands injured7. The protests, from that point forward, turned against the government as a whole, calling for its resignation. The people organized themselves into the non-cooperation movement and in early August managed to force the government to resign. The Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, fled the country to India.

A constitutional crisis ensued. The reason being the 2015 amended constitution of the country removed the provisions for the establishment of a provisional or interim government8. Thus, fears arose that the legitimacy of the newly established interim government under the popular Nobel laureate, Dr. Muhammad Yunus9, would face harsh institutional and legal obstacles. The fear, although, did not materialize10. In September, Yunus tasked his government with establishing a commission in order to draft a proposal for a new constitution, that would see systemic change to the core of the institutions of the state11. The commission finished its work in January of 2025 and submitted its proposal to the government. The scope was to ask the citizenry its opinion of the new constitution, by holding a referendum12. The proposal entered into public discourse, with a modified version of it being approved by numerous political parties through consensus.

It is important to highlight the fact that according to political scientists Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, consensus on such a vital matter is a key for a stable outcome13.  The proposal was placed to the will of the people on February 12 of 2026, simultaneously with the new parliament elections. The citizens approved of the new constitution, with a majority of 68.5%14.

Examples of its contents are Provisions 2, 11, 14, 15, 17 and 19b15 that limit or even relinquish executive and political powers from the Prime Minister. Naturally, the newly elected assembly will have the final saying in the adoption of this new charter, a process which can take up to 270 days to materialize16.

This can be somewhat contradictory. As mentioned in the beginning, the Nationalist Party was considered to be part of the problem. The new Prime Minister, Tarique Rahman, is from the Nationalist Party and is the son of President Ziaur Rahman (1977-1981) and Prime Minister Khaleda Zia (1991-1996, 2001-2006). According to the European Union election observer mission, the process was “credible”17 leaving little space to doubt the entirety of the results. The People’s League was banned from running, leaving a vast vacuum of political power in the country18. Effectively, the Nationalist Party is the sole victor of its decades-long rivalry with the League, and with a supermajority in the parliament19, the catalyst as to whether the demands of the July Revolution will be implemented. The Nationalists have been out of power since 2006, and the people seem to not take into consideration the state of the country under its rule. According to analyst Rudabeh Shahid, there is a danger that the special privileges reserved for the fighters mentioned in the beginning might pivot to the July revolutionaries20. The prize that is the state, its funds and power, might make the disadvantaged people forget their original goals, perpetuating the cycle of suffering, creating new grievances in the process. The Nationalists disagree on some aspects of empowering the President (Prov. 11) and with the proposal of not having the PM being the party leader (Prov. 15).

The next months will be of significant importance in order to answer the question of whether the democratic spirit prevailed over human nature.

Bibliography

1 Dey, S., Das, P., Dutta, S., Lakshmi, N. G., & Rozario, S. (2023). Democracy in Bangladesh hangs by a thread as press freedoms unravel. South Asia team. Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from https://www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/files/publication-pdf/Insight_SA_Mar03_V2.pdf

2 Freedom House. (2024). Bangladesh. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from https://freedomhouse.org/country/bangladesh/freedom-world/2023

3 Dwivedi, M. s. (2024, October 23). India Council of World Affairs. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from www.icwa.in: https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=11959&lid=7252

4 U.S. Department of State. (n.d.). Bangladesh (08/05). Retrieved February 14, 2026, from https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/bangladesh/73367.htm

5 Khan, A. H. (2025, March 27). Bangladesh’s Constitutional Crossroads: Reforms, Exclusion, and the Quest for Democratic Legitimacy. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from International Association of Constitutional Law: https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2025-posts/2025/3/27/bangladeshs-constitutional-crossroads-reforms-exclusion-and-the-quest-for-democratic-legitimacy

6 Lamichhane, Y. R. (2024, December 30). The Disproportionate Reservation Practice and the Fall of Hasina in Bangladesh. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2024/12/30/the-disproportionate-reservation-practice-and-the-fall-of-hasina-in-bangladesh/

7 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2025, February 12). Retrieved February 14, 2026, from www.ohchr.org: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/02/bangladesh-un-report-finds-brutal-systematic-repression-protests-calls

8 Sarkar, A., & Rahman, A. (2024, December 14). The Daily Star. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from www.thedailystar.net: https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/15th-amendment-constitution-hc-scraps-part-abolished-caretaker-system-3778971

9 Hadid, D. (2024, August 9). National Public Radio. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from www.npr.org: https://www.npr.org/2024/08/09/nx-s1-5068322/nobel-laureate-muhammad-yunus-is-sworn-in-as-interim-leader-of-bangladesh

10 Prothom Alo. (2025, February 12). Retrieved February 14, 2026, from https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/do9pn1fzk2

11 Feger, A. (2024, September 26). Illinois State University. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from illinoisstate.edu: https://news.illinoisstate.edu/2024/09/professor-riaz-to-lead-bangladeshs-constitution-reform-commission/

12 The Daily Star. (2025, January 15). Constitution reform commission proposes new principles for Bangladesh. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/constitution-reform-commission-proposes-new-principles-bangladesh-3799896

13 O’Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C., & Whitehead, L. (1986). Negotiating (and renegotiating) pacts. In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Vol. 4th). Johns Hopkins University Press.

14 Fraser, S., & Limaye, Y. (2026, February 13). BBC. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from www.bbc.com: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgrzwn4yg7jo

15 For the entire document of the new constitution visit: https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2025-11/Bangladesh%20July%20National%20Charter%202025%20%28English%20translation%29.pdf

16 Kenny, E. (2026, February 10). International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from www.idea.int: https://www.idea.int/blog/explainer-poll-and-referendum-define-bangladeshs-next-chapter

17 EU Election Observation Mission Bangladesh. (2026, February 14). Europa.eu. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eom-bangladesh-2026/credible-electoral-process-propels-renewal-democracy_en?s=410527

18 Al Jazeera. (2025, May 11). Retrieved February 14, 2026, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/11/bangladesh-bans-activities-of-awami-league-the-party-of-ousted-pm-hasina

19 Ellis-Petersen, H. (2026, February 13). The Guardian. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from www.theguardian.com: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/feb/13/bangladesh-election-bnp-wins

20 Shahid, R., & Kugelman, M. (2026, February 13). Atlantic Council. Retrieved February 14, 2026, from www.atlanticcouncil.org: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-bangladeshs-first-post-hasina-election-means-for-the-countrys-future/

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