By Christos Chondros

I. The Political Economy of the European Union

The European Union’s economy is fundamentally structured around policies of long-term fiscal and monetary stability, distributed in practice between “net beneficiaries” and “net contributors” based on each member state’s Gross National Income (GNI). This distribution operates through successive Multiannual Financial Frameworks (MFFs)—essentially economic support packages for EU member states with limited implementation periods and predetermined funding levels. These frameworks are jointly decided through the approved budget following a proposal by the European Council (EU.CO), unanimous agreement by the Council of the European Union (CEU), and approval by the European Parliament (EP).

The current seven-year MFF (2021–2027) provides for total payments of approximately €1.21 trillion^[1]—roughly €173 billion annually (equivalent to a 14.28 percent annual rate across seven years) distributed among the twenty-seven member states. These funds target recovery and development of the single market; innovation and digital economy (€149.5 billion); cohesion and European values (€426.6 billion); natural resources and environment (€401 billion); migration and border management, largely through Frontex (€25.7 billion); the defense and security pillar (€14.9 billion); political and trade relations with neighboring countries and the broader world (€110.6 billion); and European Public Administration (€82.5 billion).^[2]

In descending order of allocation, the MFF distributes payments as follows: 35.2 percent to regional development, cohesion, recovery, and investment in social values; 33.1 percent to agricultural, rural, and maritime policy plus climate action; and 12.4 percent to research, innovation, European investment strategy, the single market, and space—together representing approximately 80.7 percent of total MFF expenditure. The remaining 19.3 percent^[3] covers external action, development, and international cooperation (9.1 percent); European Public Administration, schools, and institutes (6.8 percent); border and migration management (2.1 percent); and European defense (1.2 percent).

Supplementary Funding Mechanisms

The MFF’s policy-area allocations can be augmented through Article 5 of the MFF Regulation (MFFR 2021–2027), which permits reallocation and reinforcement of funding from EU sources,^[4] and Article 15 of the EU Financial Regulation, which allows redeployment of previously unused appropriations.^[5] Beyond these provisions, the MFF is supplemented by additional European funding instruments—notably Next Generation EU (NGEU)—and various European development funds, including the European Development Fund (EDF), which primarily finances development projects in cooperation with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which supports member states’ regional projects.

NGEU represents the largest supplementary capital source, with a base of €750 billion. This is allocated as follows: regional development and cohesion, including the REACT-EU program, receives €50.6 billion as a single injection; the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which absorbs roughly 80 percent of NGEU, receives approximately €723.8 billion in dual funding—€338 billion from EU capital reserves and €385.9 billion in loan capital—bringing total financing for the “Cohesion and European Values” sector to €1.2 trillion. Agricultural and rural policy through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) receives €8.1 billion; environmental and climate action management through the Just Transition Program (JTP) receives €10.9 billion, with total sector funding for “Natural Resources and Environment” reaching €420 billion. Research and innovation under Horizon Europe receives €5.4 billion; European strategic investments through InvestEU receive €6.1 billion, bringing total funding for “Single Market, Innovation and Digital Economy” to €161 billion.

The Dependency Paradox

This detailed examination of EU macroeconomic policy—the MFF and its institutional architecture—illuminates the administrative capacity and intentions of the bloc’s leadership, which belatedly pursued a policy of economic expansion. The EU finances member state sustainability primarily as a recovery fund, spending approved allocations within defined timeframes. This structure ultimately creates relationships of dependency between states rather than promoting development and autonomy within the European regulatory framework.

Consider the dynamics between net contributors and beneficiaries. Net contributor states—Germany (+€25.5 billion), France (+€12.3 billion), the Netherlands (+€6.9 billion), Sweden (+€2.8 billion), and Italy (+€3.3 billion)^[6]—channel more funds into the MFF, creating a national economic deficit in favor of the Union while securing interest in the broader economic and strategic alliance. These states contribute more due to their stronger GNI relative to economically weaker member states—the net beneficiaries. Poland (−€11.9 billion), Greece (−€4.3 billion), Hungary (−€4.2 billion), and Romania (−€4.1 billion)^[7] receive financial assistance in sectors where they lag: the single market, technological development, European cohesion, and natural resources.

Yet beneficiary states pay a price for this favor. EU funds do not cover 100 percent of development costs and additional expenditures without corresponding national development strategies and governmental planning. Consequently, these states cover their national GDP deficits—which governmental inertia and inefficiency fail to address—with the majority of supplementary funds, persisting in a utopian economic cycle that maintains or even increases their debt.

A fiscal analysis reveals that the largest share of NGEU funding (80 percent) flows to the RRF, while the most significant policy areas—those absorbing the majority of funds—concern the Union’s internal economic survival and the remediation of long-standing pathologies, not genuine development.

By contrast, surplus countries that “donate” by covering the budget deficit gain access to what is effectively a unified market, channeling products and services of all types to deficit member states while leveraging coverage and competition clauses to their advantage—for example, export ceilings on products from each country within the EU.

Critically, the EU failed to account for the development trajectory of surrounding states operating under or through other global allied organizations. This oversight allowed anti-European states to penetrate the Union in hybrid fashion—whether cooperating or not—to cover its primary and secondary deficiencies with cheap products, affordable tools, and materials that were inadequately covered or channeled through net contributors, relabeled as “European” in the Union market. This declining economic and productive activity ultimately led to the drafting of major reports, despite the existing MFF, to restructure and redefine the Union’s position across all sectors.

II. The Draghi Report on EU Competitiveness

In 2024, the European Union confronted the prevailing global geopolitical situation and the shift among world states—in large part away from the so-called free market toward economic centralization and regionalization as models of economic pursuit and global survival. This revealed the Union’s ever-increasing dependence on and sustenance by the powers of the global hypersystem, as it found itself in an unfavorable fiscal position, with member states exhibiting poor management capacity to develop as a major economy capable of competing with the United States and the People’s Republic of China.

The crises following the Russia-Ukraine war (2022) and the Israel-Hamas/Palestinian Authority conflict (2023)—the latter prompting a UN resolution on dispute resolution through a bi-zonal state, supported by Saudi Arabia, France, Great Britain, Greece, and others, but opposed by Israel, Hungary, and the United States—radically reshaped the unified doctrine of mass economic progress. They revived principles of economic and livelihood independence and self-sufficiency among the world’s states.

This shift became the explicit pursuit of the Union’s leadership. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen commissioned economist and former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi, along with former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, to identify problems within the EU’s pillars and propose solutions.

In his September 17, 2024 address to the European Parliament and accompanying reports, Draghi communicated long-term objectives the EU must pursue to reduce the multilateral gap with hypersystemic states, addressing persistent obstacles so that the Union can confront long-term threats from both West and East.^[8]

The Draghi Report on EU Competitiveness I (2024),^[9] with Niinistö’s contribution, highlighted the Union’s overall poor financial development—comparing economic metrics and the Union’s “exposure” against those of the United States and China. It documented poorly executed and domestically depleted funding for technological research and development of new technologies, particularly artificial intelligence—only four of the fifty largest technology companies belong to the European Union. The report also identified the Union’s limited capacity for self-sufficiency in energy, security, and trade, frequently influenced by and dependent on global geopolitical superpowers: Russia, China, and the United States.

The EU currently has the most expensive energy prices—two to three times higher than China and the United States—while continuing to depend on the United States for defense preparations. Only ten member states spend equal to or more than two percent of GDP on defense.^[10]

Draghi revealed that over fifty years, European companies have invested approximately €100 billion in technological development, compared to the United States, which invests multiples of that amount, reaching one trillion dollars. Consequently, European investment constitutes merely a symbolic gesture without substantive competition, driving European entrepreneurs to seek American investment capital in American markets—connected to and controlled by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Reserve.

The migration situation within the European Union—excluding external arrivals—has dramatically worsened with the departure of young Europeans. Their primary destination is the United States, which educates them and ultimately assimilates them into the American market as skilled labor. The Union is declining significantly. Draghi identifies low productivity following the fragmentation of research and creativity at European universities—only one-third of total inventions are “housed” within them and used as exportable products in international or local markets. The productive situation within European borders grows increasingly difficult: the European Union spends nearly the same percentage of GDP as the United States on inventions and development investment programs, yet only one-tenth takes place within the twenty-seven member states.

Corroborating this complex European problem, the report itself discloses investment activities by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Central Bank (ECB), recognizing additional obstacles to development in the industrial sector and artificial intelligence on the European continent. Construction costs are formalized as excessive, while European companies, unlike their American counterparts, cannot fully support technological investments since the largest technology companies—such as American semiconductor manufacturer Nvidia—are financed by American funds and therefore subject to U.S. economic and investment policies.

According to Draghi, the ECB must—in line with historical global economic lessons and policy changes—double its financing programs based on current fiscal data, reaching at least €650 billion as a supplementary support program within the twenty-seven member states. The Union now competes not only on global economic parameters but also on research and development models, military reinforcement, and technological advancement.

III. The United States and the European Union

Economic differences between the European Union and the United States are officially reflected in macroeconomic data, documenting the EU’s delays and inadequacies as of 2025. The United States shows GDP growth of 3.8 percent (Q2 2025)^[11] with a potential decline of 0.5 percent (to 3.3 percent, Q3), in contrast to the EU,^[12] which shows sluggish GDP growth of 1.6 percent (Q3)^[13] with a potential increase of 0.1 percent (to 1.7 percent, Q4)—the same as the GDP growth rate at the beginning of the year (1.7 percent, Q1 and Q2).^[14]

The United States is moving toward a centralized model of economic development through strengthening traditional American oil companies—commonly known as “Big Oil”—both within and outside U.S. territory. In contrast, the European economic community supported from the outset “The European Green Deal” in 2024 and continues to support—until 2050—the liberal economic model of a green, resilient, and ultimately “inclusive” direction, drafting a broader regulatory framework for energy self-sufficiency known as RePowerEU.

Despite fiscal differences and divergent economic models regarding energy self-sufficiency and policy agendas, the energy sector remains extremely important. The modern economy depends on energy planning accompanied by economic stability, aiming to create surpluses capable of supporting both domestic consumption and the channeling of a significant percentage of the energy mix into technological development and research—which returns to the final fiscal performance of each state through long-term gradual development, accompanied by an increase in real GDP per capita.

The Trump Administration’s Energy Strategy

The 47th President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, during his 2024 election campaign under the slogan “Drill, baby, drill,”^[15] reinforced European concerns as a different perception of the global environmental footprint and newer research projects to exploit active, previously unexploited deposits—including significant rare earths—located within the South American, Antarctic, African, Mediterranean, and Eurasian plates.

Exploitable deposits—Minos, Zor, Aphrodite, Leviathan, Tamar, and Dalit in the Eastern Mediterranean,^[16] plus others in Antarctica^[17] worth $511 billion; oil reserves in Venezuela with an estimated value of 303.2 billion barrels—and rare earths (titanium, manganese, lithium, and graphite found mainly in Ukrainian territory, south of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia, now under Russian military occupation) mean, for the U.S. executive, immediate independence of the domestic energy mix and a source of significant revenue. After processing, these will be used for the benefit of domestic industries—aerospace, automotive, construction, metallurgical, energy, and other American companies.

This will greatly enhance material exports and manufacturing capacity through the formation of “domestic companies” which, when producing domestically, will be credited with the necessary “economic basis for development.” It will also create new jobs, reducing economically inactive members of American society relative to the unemployment rate—close to 4.6 percent, meaning approximately 7.82 million people are not working^[18]—strengthening the American industrial zone and expertise within the United States.

Trump demonstrates excessive zeal, in contrast to the European Union, wielding power, influence, and personnel, reflected on paper as interest in linking economy to energy. This is evidenced in the early years of his administration: on December 18, 2025, Trump Media & Technology Group proceeded with a $6 billion merger with TAE Technologies, which operates in energy fusion, AI production, and energy security,^[19] plus support for private space mission initiatives through close cooperation between SpaceX, owned by Elon Musk, and NASA.

The reason is clear: beyond managing EU savings funds of approximately €300 billion annually^[20] as a reliable growth market with high returns—which outweighs the excessive tariffs of 15 percent on European products in the industrial and energy sectors (automotive, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors)—the administration promotes American corporate interests at every opportunity.

Supporting this argument: one of the largest U.S. construction companies belongs to Jared Kushner, businessman and owner of The New York Observer (part of The New Yorker), who is the son-in-law and close associate of President Trump. Kushner plays an active role in foreign conferences and peace talks—notably in the Abraham Accords (September 15, 2020) during Trump’s first term, plus his ongoing involvement with Steve Witkoff^[21] in peace talks regarding the fifth consecutive Arab-Israeli war and the open Russian-Ukrainian front. Consequently, the connection between American manufacturing and industrial development is inextricably linked to the President and his inner circle, confirming the centralized nature of the government and the shift in economic model, which the European Union is unable to exploit to its advantage while diverging from its stated principles.

The dispute over peaceful resolution of the military conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, under different diplomatic “thinking” of the United States and the EU, involves economic benefits for each state or alliance toward Ukraine, which has already suffered territorial and population losses. No state or alliance assists a third party without something in return. The formidable power of the United States and the President’s business experience seek, upon conclusion of an agreement, an opportunity to be entrusted with reconstruction of affected areas of Ukraine following settlement of a satisfactory share of mineral wealth for the United States. By contrast, the European Union looks forward to the potential for rebuilding Ukraine after the “Alliance of Willing Leaders,” deriving economic benefits as an energy hub for transfer of coveted natural gas to and from Central Europe and the Balkan Peninsula, in addition to rare earths—for example, the energy agreement between Greece and Ukraine for transporting natural gas from Revythousa to Ukrainian territory within the framework of RePowerEU.^[22]

IV. The People’s Republic of China and the European Union

Without repeating EU quarterly GDP figures, the People’s Republic of China shows start-to-finish stability (2024–2025) with GDP declining from 2025: 5.4 percent at year’s start, equal to the previous year (Q4 2024 and Q1 2025), with continuous declines totaling 0.6 percent over the next two quarters (5.2 percent Q2 2025, 4.8 percent Q3 2025) and a small increase of 0.1 percent at year’s end (4.9 percent Q4 2025). At the beginning of 2026, there was a decrease of 0.7 percent (4.2 percent Q1 2026).^[23]

The different economic metrics and diametrically opposed fiscal policies between China and the EU are clearly evident in the global context. Although both plan and draft economic policy based on macroeconomic fiscal policies—the EU through the MFF, China through Five-Year Plans (5YPs)—China achieves a multi-year surplus, investment-oriented economic policy on paper. Historically, from 1949 to 1979—despite previous civil strife and ideological conflicts—China invested in telecommunications and electrical equipment development, forming industrial centers in Shanghai, Mukden, Wuhan, and elsewhere.^[24] Following this historical example, the development model under the 5YPs continued—despite the economic crisis at the end of the 20th century (1997–98)—based on decentralized economy, technological development, investment of huge amounts of capital in research and development, and creation of new tools for producing beneficial surpluses, leading to development of the domestic Chinese economy.

Today, seventy-seven years later, China is the second-largest economy, converging with the United States in GDP per capita (PPP).^[25] In contrast, the EU is seeking to redefine itself. In doing so, it is considering cutting off or ending hybrid incursions by China, which—based on its policy of “mass exportation”—contributes to strengthening the Union’s dependence on it, while simultaneously being an active full member of the rival organization of state alliances, BRICS.

To understand the definition of “mass exporter,” consider the 5YP for the current year through 2030 (2026–2030). Through exports, China provides capital support for a high-quality, technology-driven, development-oriented economy that is domestic and self-sufficient—mainly in sectors where AI, aerospace, and digital processors (chips) are based—aiming to strengthen the domestic private sector, capable of responding to periods of uncertainty and transnational disagreements, such as U.S. tariffs of 38.1 percent.^[26]

Trade Dependence and the Balance of Payments

Can this independence be achieved? In short, the EU has been and continues to be a major recipient of secondary and tertiary sector products from China. Between 2014 and 2024, China ranks first—the most important partner country in terms of volume—as an importer within the Union, accounting for 21.3 percent, while the EU exports only 8.3 percent of its total exports to China, ranking third.

For 2024, the final price of products imported from China was €520 billion, in contrast to European products exported to China worth €260 billion, burdening the EU’s balance of payments by €260 billion.^[27] Thus, the monthly return—annual balance (January–December 2024) of imports-exports between China and the EU—is negative between 20 and 22 percent.

Furthermore, of the Union’s total expenditure, the most significant individual expenditures on imported products with a deficit balance per sector are: industrial goods (€131.4 billion); machinery and vehicles of all types (€176.7 billion); and chemical and energy products (€9.7 billion).^[28] In terms of expenditure based on announced targets, the machinery and vehicles sector most interests the EU for reducing dependence, even though it imports telecommunications equipment worth €51 billion, automated data processing machinery worth €37 billion, plus electrical machinery and technical equipment systems for necessary activities worth €33 billion. The amounts spent in important sectors total approximately €460 billion. From the EU side, exports to China total around €260 billion across all sectors, creating a percentage deficit of 43.4 percent.

The EU’s balance of payments with China reveals the dependence of individual member states. Trade transactions (in billions of euros) by country show: Germany, imports of €95.7 billion (21.1 percent) versus exports of €89.9 billion (12.7 percent); Italy, imports of €45.5 billion (20.6 percent) versus exports of €15.3 billion (5 percent); France, imports of €43.7 billion (17.3 percent) versus exports of €23.8 billion (8.7 percent); Netherlands, imports of €108.9 billion (25.2 percent) versus exports of €23.7 billion (9 percent).^[29] If the remaining EU member states are added in detail,^[30] the balance difference skyrockets to €282.4 billion,^[31] which is not offset by exports to China, resulting in a European deficit. Of the 27 member states, only Luxembourg (+€80 million) and Ireland (+€144 million) have a surplus, i.e., positive balance.

Germany’s Selective Diplomacy

The question posed at the beginning remains unanswered and raises an important sub-question. As explained in “The Political Economy of the European Union,” net contributors cover the Union’s budget deficit while themselves seeking, through its institutions, to redefine its position. Following this, how is it possible to redefine your position vis-à-vis China while the Union is weaker economically and developmentally?

Germany is the largest economy in EU fiscal terms, covering—in conjunction with other member states—the largest part of the deficit of net beneficiaries. It also seeks to invest and develop new technologies necessary to implement the green transition plan within a specified time frame (RePowerEU, 2030–2050), yet it votes in favor of EU energy and economic independence from the hypersystem.

From these, Germany practices à la carte diplomatie (selective diplomacy). It participates in the International Climate Initiative (ICI)—cooperation between Germany and China on low carbon emissions, such as the energy cooperation project between the two countries in provincial cities on both sides, signed during the China Carbon Market Conference in 2025—and “Sino-German Energy Cooperation” (Energiepartnerschaft), under which Germany and China cooperate on climate and energy policies by exchanging information between private companies and governments and experiences on technical and regulatory solutions, promoting the global energy transition.^[32]

On the institutional framework, there are supervisory or service bodies on both sides, such as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the National Energy Administration (NEA), and the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK). Following cooperation within the framework of bilateral agreements, “Thematic Groups” are set up with work topics—first “energy,” second “energy efficiency”—jointly researching various models of energy development or obstacles.^[33] The proposals are communicated to both states through the German Society for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit—GIZ),^[34] undertaken by the BMWK, allowing business circles the opportunity to effectively promote their positions in partner countries, providing an opportunity to contribute their expertise to new projects on both sides.

As an aside, Germany was the global powerhouse in solar energy from 2004 to 2011, thanks to the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG)^[35] and guaranteed feed-in tariffs, a significant source of income.^[36] By selling its ready-made equipment en masse through German companies, such as Centrotherm,^[37] to countries such as China, it surpassed itself as a global power in terms of production cost and end product. Consequently, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, by creating affordable solar panels and photovoltaics in accordance with German standards, created a cheap mass market, preventing German companies to date from recovering and reducing production costs.

Therefore, through the BMWK, Germany maintains close contact with China, consistently receiving Chinese machinery and other industrial materials—despite the decoupling it “seeks” on its own or within the Union—i.e., by purchasing solar panels, processed minerals from the East on the basis of the EU-China Agreement on Investment, signed in 2013 by Chancellor Angela Merkel. The “German market,” fearing the loss of business relations with Chinese companies, prevented punitive tariffs through the European Commission, setting minimum import prices (MIP) and maximum volume thresholds, which often readily determine the final price of photovoltaic products labeled as “European,” distributed by German private companies to other member states of the Union for payment, reinforcing this false narrative.

Therefore, in response to the initial question, no leader of EU member states seeks complete independence from China, especially the beneficiary member states—Germany through intergovernmental bilateral or multilateral agreements, receiving products from the East—which they significantly lack in order to develop their economies or support the European green transition portfolio, where they themselves have set and deposited, in descending order, the second-highest amount of capital in the MFF and European funds such as NGEU.

Bibliography

[1]The total officially reported budget exceeds the EU’s initial announcement, i.e., the MFF (€1.074 trillion), and the current total funding per “Policy Area” (€1.210 trillion). Absolute difference: €136.82 billion; percentage difference: 12.74%. The absolute and percentage difference within the four-year period (2018–2021) is due to inflationary factors in the economy, which reduced the monetary power of the Eurozone, with a time value effect of around 12.74 percent. In layman’s terms, the total budget decreased in value but increased numerically, rising from €1.074 trillion to €1.211 trillion, due to “current prices,” which included inflation of around 2 percent. If the budget had not been increased at that time due to inflation, the EU’s ability to carry out projects would have been effectively reduced.

[2]Directorate-General for Budget and European Commission. 2021. “The EU’s 2021-2027 long-term budget and NextGenerationEU.” European Commission. pp. 15–19. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d3e77637-a963-11eb-9585-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.

[3]The percentage amounts to exactly 20 percent after accounting for rounding and other expenses, excluding notified expenditure of the “Policy Areas,” which is 0.02 percent, below the threshold.

[4]EU.CO. 2023. “COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL, Technical adjustment of the multiannual financial framework for 2024 in accordance with Article 4 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual finance.” European Commission. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52023DC0320.

[5]Pari, Marianna, and Members’ Research Service. 2024. “Parliament’s consent to the revision of the 2021-2027 MFF.” European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2024/759581/EPRS_ATA(2024)759581_EN.pdf.

[6]Buchholz, Katharina. 2023. “EU Budget, Which Countries are EU Contributors and Beneficiaries?” Statista. https://www.statista.com/chart/18794/net-contributors-to-eu-budget/.

[7]Buchholz. “EU Budget, Which Countries are EU Contributors and Beneficiaries?”

[8]“Address by Mr. Draghi – Presentation of the report on the Future of European competitiveness – European Parliament – Strasbourg – 17 September.” 2024. European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/fcbc7ada-213b-4679-83f7-69a4c2127a25_en.

[9]“The Draghi report on EU competitiveness.” 2024. European Commission. https://commission.europa.eu/topics/competitiveness/draghi-report_en.

[10]The 2 percent financial defense contribution to NATO and the EU was changed after the presentation of Mario Draghi’s research to the European Parliament, under the Presidency of Donald J. Trump, to 5 percent of each country’s GDP.

[11]BEA. 2025. “Gross Domestic Product, 2nd Quarter 2025 (Third Estimate), GDP by Industry, Corporate Profits (Revised), and Annual Update | U.S.” Bureau of Economic Analysis. https://www.bea.gov/news/2025/gross-domestic-product-2nd-quarter-2025-third-estimate-gdp-industry-corporate-profits.

[12]The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the European Union is calculated on the basis of a method predetermined for all member states, where the final value and percentage are determined by adding up the GDPs of the member states as a group and calculating the average value of the twenty-seven (27).

[13]Eurostat. 2025. “GDP up by 0.3% and employment up by 0.2% in the euro area.” European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-05122025-ap.

[14]It should be noted that a decline in GDP is not necessarily negative if it is aimed at development investments, which show a decline in GDP in the short term, i.e., at the time of expenditure, but in the long term result in a significant increase in GDP.

[15]This slogan was not created by President Donald J. Trump; it was first used in 2008 by Sarah Palin, then a candidate for the Vice Presidency of the United States with the Republican Party, who strongly promoted the extraction of natural gas and oil as a principle of energy self-sufficiency and economic freedom.

[16]Aligizaki, Aspasia. 2023. Energy Law and Geopolitics (The case of the South-Eastern Mediterranean). SAKKOULAS PUBLICATIONS. pp. 242–247.

[17]The extraction and exploitation of deposits and rare earths in Antarctica is currently prohibited until 2048 under the Madrid Protocol – Antarctic Environmental Protection Treaty, signed on October 4, 1991.

[18]“US unemployment rate hits four-year high of 4.6%.” 2025. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/17a1674d-0e6b-4e9b-9c0d-82de5887be15.

[19]“Trump Media and Technology Group to Merge with TAE Technologies.” 2025. TAE Technologies. https://tae.com/trump-media-and-technology-group-to-merge-with-tae-technologies/.

[20]Letta, Enrico. 2024. “MUCH MORE THAN A MARKET. SPEED, SECURITY, SOLIDARITY. Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens.” consilium.europa.eu. p. 11. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/ny3j24sm/much-more-than-a-market-report-by-enrico-letta.pdf.

[21]Steve Witkoff: Founder and entrepreneur of a real estate group for the construction of houses and other building complexes under the name “Witkoff Group” in New York (1997); Member of the Industry Group for the Great American Economic Renaissance (2020); Special Envoy of the United States to the Middle East (2025). One of Donald J. Trump’s closest associates, coming from a business background and education, not diplomatic ones—a political move chosen by the President himself, which demonstrates the general diplomatic shift in U.S. practices on the world stage.

[22]Doulgkeri, Foteini. 2025. “Energy agreement between Greece and Ukraine: How natural gas will be transported from Revythousa.” Euronews. https://gr.euronews.com/2025/11/16/energeiaki-symfonia-elladas-oukranias-fysiko-aerio-apo-th-revithousa.

[23]“China reports 5.2% GDP growth in Q1-Q3 – Chinadaily.com.cn.” 2025. China Daily. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202510/20/WS68f59852a310f735438b5e26.html.

[24]CIA and DOI. 1972. CIA Reading Room, 06928824: Intelligence Report Peking and Environs. pp. 13–17.

[25]Honohan, Patrick. 2025. “China vs. the US: Which GDP is bigger?” Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/china-vs-us-which-gdp-bigger.

[26]McClelland, Robert, and John Wong. 2026. “TPC Tariff Tracker.” Tax Policy Center. https://taxpolicycenter.org/features/tracking-trump-tariffs. (Figure 2).

[27]Eurostat. 2025. “China-EU – international trade in goods statistics – Statistics Explained – Eurostat.” European Commission. (Figures 6, 7). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=China-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics.

[28]Eurostat. “China-EU – international trade in goods statistics – Statistics Explained – Eurostat.” (Figure 7).

[29]Eurostat. “China-EU – international trade in goods statistics – Statistics Explained – Eurostat.” (Table 1a, 1b).

[30]In this context, member states significant in terms of the EU’s macroeconomic policy and fiscal management—not strategic importance—are recorded, excluding the Baltic states, which also have a significant deficit from Chinese imports totaling €3.046 billion: Estonia (€740 million), Latvia (€631 million), and Lithuania (€1.675 billion). These will be reflected as appropriate in another chapter based on Military/Strategic Policy.

[31]Eurostat. “China-EU – international trade in goods statistics – Statistics Explained – Eurostat.” (Table 1c).

[32]Energiepartnerschaft. n.d. “About the Sino-German Energy Partnership.” climateandenergypartnerships.org. https://energypartnership.cn/about-us/.

[33]Thematic Groups: (a) NEA – “Energy”: Energy Market, Energy Flexibility Sector, Decentralized Renewable Energy (Agri-PV & Biomethane), Sustainable Heating, Power-to-X (PtX) including green hydrogen. (b) NDRC – “Energy Efficiency”: Energy Efficiency in Industry, Energy Efficiency in Cities, Energy Efficiency Networks, Innovative Business and Financial Models.

[34]German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ): A secretariat with full-time advisors in Berlin and Beijing, acting as a point of contact and coordination for activities between Germany and the People’s Republic of China.

[35]Since its first year in force (2001), the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) has been renewed in line with German needs and European regulations. EEG renewal years: 2020, 2021, 2023. Following the latest renewal in Berlin, the aim is to accelerate the expansion of renewable sources to 80 percent before 2030.

[36]Nemet, Gregory. 2019. How Solar Energy Became Cheap: A Model for Low-Carbon Innovation. Routledge. pp. 106–110.

[37]“Centrotherm receives equipment order from China.” 2008. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/centrotherm/centrotherm-receives-equipment-order-from-china-idUSL1455790920080714/.