To provide the best experiences, we use technologies like cookies to store and/or access device information. Consenting to these technologies will allow us to process data such as browsing behavior or unique IDs on this site. Not consenting or withdrawing consent, may adversely affect certain features and functions.
The technical storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user, or for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network.
The technical storage or access is necessary for the legitimate purpose of storing preferences that are not requested by the subscriber or user.
The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes.
The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for anonymous statistical purposes. Without a subpoena, voluntary compliance on the part of your Internet Service Provider, or additional records from a third party, information stored or retrieved for this purpose alone cannot usually be used to identify you.
The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes.
By George Lakasas
The United States-Israel War against the Islamic Republic of Iran has created a situation unique in the European Union’s history. The failed attempt at striking the United Kingdom’s military bases in Cyprus, with the island being an EU member, on March 1st and 2nd has resulted in military buildup near the island. Tehran used its self-producing “Shahed” (meaning “witness”1) drones, who have been used extensively by Russia in its war with Ukraine2. Fellow EU and NATO countries have responded positively when it comes to helping the island defend itself. France sent anti-missile and anti-drone systems, which they did not name, and the multi-mission frigate Languedoc3, which has seen combat in December of 2023 when it shot down at least two Houthi drones4. Simultaneously, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle and its Carrier Strike Group will be anchoring in the Eastern Mediterranean, leaving its post as a deterrence force against Russia’s activities in the Baltic Sea. Paris’ only aircraft carrier will patrol the area near Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon and Syria5.
Spain will send its air defense frigate Cristóbal Colón, which was also stationed in the Baltic Sea along the French aircraft carrier6. The warship has participated in the past in the NATO-led anti-piracy Operation Ocean Shield in Somalia7.
Willing to also participate in the defense of the EU soil is Italy, confirming the intention to station anti-missile and anti-drone systems8. The Netherlands, after receiving an official request by the French government, started considering sending the air defense frigate Zr.Ms. Evertsen, having been previously deployed in the Baltics9. The frigate had previously participated in the patrolling EU-led multinational anti-piracy operation “Atalanta” in Somalia.10
The UK, after an initial inertia, provided additional security measures to its two military bases which occupy an area of about three percent of the island. The deployment of its air defense destroyer HMS Dragon and two Wildcat helicopters was also announced11.
Lastly, the first country to provide defensive support was Greece. The newly delivered French-constructed frigate Kimon and veteran frigate Psara, which has participated in Operation Atalanta12 and the 2024 EU anti-Houthi operation “Aspides”, during which it engaged in anti-drone combat13, were deployed along with four F-16 Vipers jets14.
Analyzing interests
Excluding the UK, a superficial assessment of the military deployments in Cyprus raises some questions. The actions of the European powers seem to be motivated primarily by concerns over the security of first and foremost the freedom of navigation. All the countries that acted have a strong structural dependence on maritime trade, making the security of key sea routes a strategic priority. Spain, for instance, occupies a geographically vital position at the western gateway to the Mediterranean through the Strait of Gibraltar. It would only make it obvious that the eastern gateway should be safe for transit of vessels. Cyprus’ position near the chokepoint of the Suez Canal creates a perfect foothold for any power that wants to protect its trade interests.
Second of all, something that could not necessarily be a major initiative, is European unity. As it was mentioned, Cyprus is a member-state of the EU. The war in Ukraine and the open conflict with the US are producing constant challenges in regard to European unity and integration. The major topic on the agenda in Brussels is, among others, the defense and security of the EU through the lenses of a common defense program, and militarization of the union. The pro-federalist voices inside the union can point to this event and reaction as a good step towards further integration.
Individually speaking, it is interesting to analyze France’s and Greece’s interests. For Paris, the interest lies in both state and personal concerns. France seeks to project itself as an independent alternative to the US, and potential leader of the EU. As the only nuclear power in the union, France sees itself as the protector of the European continent against aggressors, including Russia, and actively seeks to rival Washington D.C. on as many theaters as possible. With its now justified presence in Cyprus, France can utilize this foothold and as a jumping point re-enter the Middle Eastern scenery, projecting influence in Lebanon and Syria. Its traditional interest on Lebanon has led to open diplomatic confrontations with Israel in recent years, and the now open window that is Syria creates hopes for Paris to invest in its former colony. Damascus has already been approached by Washington D.C. and Donald Trump, and the scale of external influence seem to favor the US, rather than France.
Concurrently, France can deter Turkey’s aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and create a growing and continuous headache to Ankara, if it chooses to maintain its mentioned presence for the foreseeable future. Cyprus can, therefore, justify potential French involvement when it comes to protecting itself from Turkish harassment inside its EEZ.
The Cyprus incident has given the opportunity for France and Greece to grow their relations, as their interests seem to align in the Mediterranean.
When it comes to personal stakes, this refers to Emmanuel Macron’s desire to leave a strong legacy. Macron portraits himself as a consequential figure, whose term as President expires in 2027. Whoever becomes the next head of state, in Macron’s mind, should not be able to criticize him on the foreign affairs aspect of his presidency, and this is what he is building towards to.
Greece, on the other hand, was the first to deploy support. Cyprus is the second and only other Hellenic state in the world, a fact that makes the mentioned action easily justifiable. The decision was made with its alliances’ benefits also in mind. The bilateral relations between Greece and the US were harmed with the election of Trump in 2024, and the Greek government is always looking to find opportunities to mend them. Defending British, thus potential-US hosting, bases send a message to Washington D.C. that Athens is willing to, by actions, improve their relations.
When analyzing Greek foreign policy decision-making, it is important to add to the calculations Turkey. The war against Iran has created a domino effect in which Greece can justify taking security measures that would not normally be able to do so without extensive Turkish reaction. Therefore, Greece transported one Patriot PAC-III15 missile system to its eastern island Karpathos16. Notably, in 2024 the island was the epicenter of a diplomatic incident between the two countries17, in which Turkey eventually prevailed. This decision by Athens can be interpreted as also a response to Turkey’s abstract arguments for the demilitarization of the Dodecanese islands.
At the same time, Athens deployed another Patriot missile system in its northern borders with Bulgaria, in order to assist with their air defense. The decision was made following the appropriate request by Sofia18. It is notable to mention that Greece already is tasked with the protection of the airspaces of its fellow NATO countries, Sofia, Tirana, Podgorica and Skopje19.
Athens’ decision to militarize further some of its sovereignty should not be viewed as a unique event, but within the context of a security dilemma, that Turkey initiated, rather than Greece.
In the coming months, Greece should monitor the situation in Cyprus. At the same time, it should get ready to prevent potential loss of diplomatic capital due to the close relations that Turkey has with both Italy and Spain. Although fellow EU member-state, their economic investments vis-à-vis Turkey can potentially leave her exposed to such losses.
References
1 Liddell, H. G., & Scott, R. (2020, August 2). Perseus Hopper. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0057:entry=ma/rtus
2 Anokhin, I. (2026). January 2026 Updated Analysis of Russian Shahed-type UAVs Deployment Against Ukraine. Institute for Science and International Security. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/January-2026-Updated-Analysis-of-Russian-Shahed-type-UAVs-Deployment-Against-Ukraine_Feb-10_2026.pdf
3 Stamouli, N. (2026, March 3). Politico. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://www.politico.eu/article/france-sends-anti-missile-anti-drone-systems-and-a-frigate-to-cyprus/
4 Vavasseur, X. (2023, December 11). Naval News. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/12/french-frigate-languedoc-used-aster-15-missiles-against-drones/
5 Petrequin, S. (2026, March 4). Associated Press. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://apnews.com/article/france-macron-aircraft-carrier-charles-de-gaulle-mediterranean-dd185933de5e5cee87828768c0046fba
6 Bustos, G. L. (2026, March 5). United24. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://united24media.com/latest-news/spain-deploys-its-most-advanced-warship-to-cyprus-after-iranian-attacks-16530
7 NATO. (2022, May 19). Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/operations-and-missions/counter-piracy-operations-2008-2016
8 Rome Editorial Staff. (2026, March 5). Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://en.ilsole24ore.com/art/italy-like-france-and-spain-will-send-naval-assets-to-help-cyprus-crosettos-announcement-AI81VimB
9 Brahy, J. (2026, March 5). Army Recognition. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2026/netherlands-redeploys-hnlms-evertsen-air-defense-frigate-to-protect-french-carrier-strike-group
10 EU NAVFOR. (2009, November 23). Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://web.archive.org/web/20111009153556/http://www.eunavfor.eu/2009/11/eunavfor-meets-omani-authorities/
11 Parker, J. (2026, March 3). BBC. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g74npdwnyo
12 Hellenic Navy. (2009, March 30). Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://web.archive.org/web/20110614121552/http://www.hellenicnavy.gr/new_details.asp?hn_new_id=1540
13 Makris, A. (2024, July 7). Greek Reporter. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://greekreporter.com/2024/07/07/greek-frigate-shoots-down-houthi-drones-red-sea/
14 Shamim, S. (2026, March 6). Al Jazeera. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/6/why-have-europe-australia-sent-military-assets-to-the-middle-east
15 Hellenic Air Force. (n.d.). Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://www.haf.gr/en/equipment/patriot-pac-iii/
16 Newsroom. (2026, March 4). News247. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://www.news247.gr/en/patriot-missiles-arrive-in-karpathos-images-from-the-missile-transport/
17 Newsroom. (2024, July 23). Proto Thema. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://en.protothema.gr/2024/07/23/after-issuing-a-navtex-for-turkish-continental-shelf-south-of-karpathos-turkey-sent-warships-to-monitor-an-italian-research-vessel/
18 Michalopoulos, S. (2026, March 6). Euractiv. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://www.euractiv.com/news/greece-takes-over-bulgarias-anti-ballistic-protection-against-iran/
19 Newsroom. (2024, October 20). Independent Balkan Agency. Retrieved March 6, 2026, from https://www.ibnaeu.com/en/2024/10/20/i-ellada-arnithike-aeroporikes-peripolies-sti-valtiki-logo-ton-valkanion/