The architecture of regime change

Written by Manolis Skoulikas

Despite the bold—if arbitrary—assurances by many anti-American analysts regarding Iran’s lack of ambition to acquire nuclear weapons, the level of uranium enrichment the regime has already demonstrably achieved, makes that alternative clearly plausible. An alternative of horror and mortal danger for humanity, because—as has been shown for centuries—Muslim fundamentalism does not act according to Western “logic” or utilitarian motives, but rather from a primal instinct of “honor” and emotionally charged, self-destructive vengeance. This vengeance overcompensates for the long-standing oppression and exploitation by the Western “Satan” and their eternal Zionist adversary.

Given the partial success of recent airstrikes by Israel and the USA, the only viable remaining option to prevent this atrocious prospect is the overthrow of the Iranian regime of the mullahs and its replacement by a less radical political structure.

But how feasible are these alternatives?

Initially, the downfall of the authoritarian regime has certain foundations:

1. The population is economically oppressed—though not extremely so. There are frequent power outages due to widespread energy mismanagement and lack of available resources (albeit paradoxical for a major oil-producing country). Many goods are unavailable and restricted for both economic and religious reasons. The system is heavily bureaucratic, nepotistic, and corrupt, stifling economic development beyond small to medium enterprises. Several economic sectors are in forced stagnation.
2. Political oppression is unprecedented. The regime interferes not only in political expression but also in the social and cultural lives of citizens, who resent this medieval theocracy, reminiscent of Orwellian authoritarianism.
3. Active separatist groups exist in significant regions of the country—regions that are also demographically homogeneous. With proper support and coordination, these could serve as centers of resistance and destabilization, and possibly achieve autonomy if the regime falls. These new state entities could be friendly to their supporters and serve as local allies.
4. Revolts and social unrest have deep roots in the country, as evidenced by the four-month uprising following the murder of Kurdish activist Mahsa Amini. Especially since Iran’s population is primarily between 35–40 years old—children born during the 80s to be used en masse for mine clearance during the Iran-Iraq war—the inhuman societal architectures of the mullahs are coming back to haunt them.
5. The ruling religious elite and its institutions are widely despised, as shown during recent protests. The Revolutionary Guard consists of individuals who unleash sadistic tendencies on any unfortunate soul who excites their psychopathic instincts. After the recent US-Israeli strikes, they have unleashed a wave of arrests of any suspected dissidents, a development that will further divide the population and soon erase the patriotic sentiment triggered by the Israeli attack.
6. Iran has been in entropic decline for decades, visible in the disintegration of institutions and innovation in many sectors. According to general systems theory, this is a hallmark of decaying systems: regardless of starting conditions, outcomes are predictably problematic and lead to collapse due to the system’s entropic corruption.

But there are also many reasons the regime could survive:

1. The mullahs and the Revolutionary Guard have entrenched themselves for nearly half a century and maintain tight control over the state apparatus and society through a vast network of informants and enforcement mechanisms. Foreign influence and propaganda access (via media or internet) is nearly zero, so revolutionary conditions akin to the “viral” spread of the Arab Spring cannot be replicated.
2. The Revolutionary Guard is a self-sufficient, fully structured army capable of countering a coup by the regular Iranian military or foreign invasion. In fact, it was designed for this purpose, and its members’ physical survival depends on resisting effectively.
3. The recent incitement against the regime comes from Israel and the US, framing any opposition as treason against the Iranian homeland and religion. Aggression has put the country on high alert, halting internal dissent due to national unity in the face of an external threat. Broad Zionist action in the region casts Iran as the primary defender of the Muslim world, adding prestige to the regime as long as the “Axis of Resistance” exists.
4. Decades of religious fundamentalism and repression have created loyal followers of the mullahs. Although not the majority, they are not a small minority either. These followers are dispersed throughout society, and most citizens carry subconscious identification with their oppressors or use submission and appeasement as survival strategies. Organized resistance is therefore difficult. Historically, oppressed peoples react impulsively and re-submit once their oppressors show resilience and deny any concessions.
5. Chinese support—and pressure—is crucial. The Sino-American rivalry hinges on whether peace prevails in the region. Peace would enable IMEC and undercut China’s Belt and Road Initiative with the Indian alternative. Neither China nor Netanyahu, who faces imprisonment after hostilities cease, favor peace. On the side routing peace, in this particular set of circumstances, there is a convergence of interests between unlikely bedfellows: Trump, who wants to secure trade routes, and the mullahs, who fear for their political and possibly physical survival.

Personal Outlook

Though it’s risky to make predictions in such turbulent equations, my personal view is that it’s currently very difficult to even begin the process of regime change. Iranians are united due to attacks on their country and on the broader Muslim world by Israel.

The best strategy would be to give the mullahs time and space to “hang themselves” with the paranoid purges they’re already committing. Simultaneously, heavy investment should be made in propaganda within Iran using provocateurs, fifth-column tactics, and subversive propaganda aimed at personal discrediting of regime figures. Establish information networks for global condemnation, highlight secular Muslim states as alternatives, organize dissenting groups limited to dialogue, commit targeted attacks only against the mullahs, provoke repression to trigger greater dissent, sabotage power infrastructure, wage asymmetric warfare to destabilize and discredit the regime, cyberattack state internet surveillance mechanisms, and ramp up international propaganda especially in secular Muslim states.

Expose China’s manipulation of Iran, revealing the exploitative debt-trap agreement between them. Offer to buy Iran’s debt from China to bring Tehran closer to the West. Promise modernization and cooperation if a friendly government emerges. Promote secular Muslim states’ participation in the Abraham Accords. Use Turkey as a Chinese-aligned disruptor in the region, so Iran is not China’s sole option, and then leverage the Kurdish issue to pressure Turkey.

Given all this—and not accounting for rapidly changing global dynamics—an optimistic prediction would place the regime’s collapse within one to two years. But the US likely doesn’t have that time amid escalating Sino-American tensions—and Netanyahu certainly doesn’t unless he’s granted amnesty.

As for the day after the mullahs fall, the State Department, in its usual self-destructive shortsightedness, will likely install a pathetic puppet, leading the country into civil war as it has in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq (not to mention the repeated failures of the Arab Spring). Unless, by some miracle, Rubio prevails over the Kafkaesque “banality of stupidity” that plagues the Department’s fearful bureaucracy.