The common threat that Greece, Cyprus and the Kurds face

By Ioanna Theou

The evolving geopolitical landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean raises an important strategic question for Greece and Cyprus: should they reconsider their current approach toward Kurdish actors in Syria and Turkey? While both Athens and Nicosia have traditionally prioritized stability, international law, and multilateral diplomacy in managing relations with Ankara, Turkey’s increasingly assertive regional posture necessitates a reassessment of available strategic instruments. Engagement with Kurdish political actors can be understood as a calibrated component of a broader balancing strategy.

Greek–Turkish relations have historically been shaped by conflict, territorial disputes, and population displacements. The foundations of the modern Turkish state were due to the blood of the Greeks -as well as from Armenians- in the Greek-Turkish war of 1922. Yet, it was not only the massacres of 1922. The violent episodes had already begun with the first persecutions of the Greeks prior to the First World War, including the labor battalions (amele taburu). The campaign against the Orthodox Greeks of the Ottoman Empire started long before 1922. A brief historical overview is therefore necessary at this point because as we can see the Greek government tends to forget.

The anger and hate toward the Orthodox Greek minorities of the Ottoman Empire started back to the period of the Tanzimat reforms. These Western type reforms aimed at modernizing the Ottoman Empire, an Empire that had once glory and power. The reforms favored the Empire’s minorities -due to their business operations that they had, many of them involved with the trade-, who for many years had been treated as ‘’second-class’’ citizens or else as ‘’subjects’’. Greek communities benefited economically, as they operated as intermediaries between East and West.

At the same time, however, the Empire faced severe economic problems and territorial challenges. Its expansionist wars had come to an end, and Ottoman territories were gradually lost. Amid these challenges, Neo-Ottomanism emerged. The early Neo-Ottomans consisted primarily of Ottoman Muslims but also included members from the minorities -Greek, Armenians-. Initially they sought legal equality, civic inclusion and reforms that would benefit the citizens and not for the Sultan. Over time, the Young Turks -a new term for Neo-Ottomas- distanced themselves from minority groups and adopted a more radical approach toward them.

Specifically, the Armenian and Greek orthodox minorities became primary targets. The Greek Orthodox was among the first victims of this new nationalist ideology. Henry Morgenthau, who served as the United States ambassador to the Ottoman Empire from 1913-1916, confirms that certain Young Turks leaders systemically implemented policies of violent Turkification against the Greek Orthodox population. Even before the outbreak of the First World War, more than 100.000 Orthodox Greeks had already deported -even in some cases violently- from the Ottoman Empire due to strategic wartime considerations.

At this point, a careful comparison can be made with the methods later used by Nazi Germany. The systematic targeting of specific population groups did not begin with the Second World War. Elements of such practices can already be observed earlier in the twentieth century. In this context, the Ottoman-German alliance during the First World War suggests that similar approaches to population control and security policy were already taking shape.

The defeat in the First World War represented a major threat for the Ottoman existence. For the first time the Greek Orthodox populations and the Greek state had an opportunity to reclaim Smyrna through the Treaty of Sevres. However, this opportunity was destroyed due to political divisions

Events such as the burning and slaughtering of Smyrna in 1922, the population exchange formalized under the Treaty of Lausanne, the Istanbul Pogrom of 1955, and the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 — carried out in two phases known as Operation Attila I and Attila II — have deeply influenced Greek and Cypriot threat perceptions. These historical experiences continue to shape strategic thinking, particularly in light of ongoing disputes over maritime zones and sovereignty in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. The Greek government under Konstantinos Karamanlis and Archbishop Makarios III has been criticized for adopting a submissive stance toward the Cyprus Issue.

At the same time, Kurdish populations in Turkey and Syria have experienced fluctuating periods of repression and limited political accommodation. The early years of governance by the Justice and Development Party generated cautious optimism for a political settlement of the Kurdish issue. However, the reformist momentum weakened under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, especially following domestic political crises and regional instability after 2011. Turkish military operations in northern Syria and northern Iraq have further intensified Ankara’s securitized approach toward Kurdish actors.

Turkey’s foreign policy orientation over the past two decades reflects a broader ambition for strategic autonomy and regional influence. Strategic thinking associated with Ahmet Davutoğlu and maritime doctrines such as “Blue Homeland” illustrate Ankara’s intent to project power beyond its immediate borders. Thus, Turkey has expanded its defense industry and strengthened cooperation with European defense companies, including Leonardo and Piaggio Aerospace. As a member of NATO, Turkey remains embedded within Western security structures, which complicates any overt balancing strategy by fellow alliance members Greece and Turkey.

Within this strategic environment, Greece and Cyprus have largely avoided meaningful engagement with Kurdish political structures. Their policy has prioritized alliance cohesion, diplomatic channels, and reliance on international legal frameworks. While this approach reduces short-term escalation risks, it may also limit strategic flexibility and bargaining leverage. In international relations terms, small and medium-sized states often rely on indirect balancing mechanisms rather than direct confrontation. Carefully calibrated engagement with Kurdish actors could represent such a mechanism.

Such engagement could take several forms. Humanitarian assistance to Kurdish-administered areas in northern Syria, delivered through multilateral frameworks, would carry minimal diplomatic risk while reinforcing Greece’s image as a normative actor committed to human rights and regional stability. Informal diplomatic channels with Kurdish representatives could provide Athens and Nicosia with additional situational awareness and potential leverage in moments of heightened tension with Ankara. Crucially, these forms of engagement would not amount to formal recognition of Kurdish independence movements, which would carry significant legal and geopolitical consequences.

Nevertheless, any adjustment in policy must consider alliance constraints and escalation dynamics. Greece and Turkey coexist within NATO’s integrated command structure, and overt support for armed Kurdish groups could generate serious intra-alliance friction. Moreover, the European Union’s broader strategic interests in managing migration, energy security, and regional stability impose additional limitations on unilateral initiatives. Therefore, any engagement strategy would need to be gradual, coordinated, and framed within multilateral norms.

Ultimately, the issue is not whether Greece and Cyprus should adopt a confrontational posture toward Turkey, but whether they can diversify their strategic toolkit in a manner consistent with international law and alliance obligations. Engagement with Kurdish actors, if pursued carefully, could serve as a subtle instrument of strategic hedging rather than escalation. In a region characterized by fluid alignments and shifting balances of power, maintaining strategic optionality may prove as important as preserving stability.After all, what rights can meaningfully be discussed, when clientelism, corruption, and patronage practices continue to prevail to this day?

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