The New Ukraine

Written by Manolis Skoulikas

The war in Ukraine will be determined by the aims of the Russians, as they hold the initiative and the strongest military force in the wider region—with the exception of the United States, which, however, would find it very difficult to become involved with significant forces in the near future, since their central strategic focus is necessarily the Pacific[1].

Russia has set, among other objectives, the goal of “denazifying” Ukraine. If we set aside any exaggeration of the term for propaganda purposes, this aim is likely oriented toward overthrowing the Zelensky government, removing far-right and ultra-nationalist elements from senior governmental ranks, and replacing them with either a pro-Russian government or one that is at least not hostile to Russia and to the Russian-speaking populations within its borders[2].

Such a goal, however, is very difficult in the present historical moment, because the Ukrainian people have suffered an invasion, have lost many thousands of dead in this war, and have additionally radicalized toward a more nationalistic position through the propaganda imposed by the Zelensky regime after 2014—propaganda which intensified during the war. Any attempt at influencing the Ukrainian population will be very difficult, because a dominant narrative has already formed in society—one directed against Russia, focused on Ukrainian national identity, and hostile toward anyone who threatens it.[3]

Although there are numerous techniques of influence at both the individual and systemic level, there is only one documented technique of resistance to influence: the prior formation of opinion regarding the issue at stake[4]. In this case, after 2014, systematic propaganda was applied in Ukraine, which created a strong national consciousness and, drawing on the historical Soviet oppression, established a solid anti-Russian sentiment. This position is now extremely difficult to overturn, as the deadly war with Russia has made it quite cohesive among the majority of the Ukrainian population who are not clearly ethnically Russian.

Even if, therefore, the Zelensky government were to fall, the next government would not enjoy broad popular acceptance if it were pro-Russian; consequently, it would be very unstable and likely unable to remain in power for long.[5] Moreover, if Ukrainian nationalism has been deeply rooted in the Ukrainian soul, it would be difficult for any government to survive that does not embrace such principles and goals. However, this last point is debatable, since the recent propaganda that cultivated this nationalism was essentially imposed by what was effectively a coup-born regime, which enforced it through terroristic and ethnic-cleansing practices; thus, the fall of this regime could stir new social sentiments that do not strictly embrace this nationalism. Furthermore, the enormous destruction in human and material resources in Ukraine might suppress the nationalistic spirit, as it could be blamed for all this devastation.

Here it is necessary to mention that, on the individual level—and perhaps on a wider systemic level—credibility is often more important than distancing oneself from one’s abuser. People who seek help to escape an abusive partner, if they ultimately return to that partner, stop complaining and justify them—even as the abuse resumes. [6]This occurs because credibility is more important within society, as it is a cornerstone of human social structures.

Ukraine constituted the strongest pole of resistance against the October Revolution during the Russian civil war. When it lost the war, it was incorporated into the Soviet Union and soon suffered a devastating artificial famine at the hands of Stalin in order to subdue and punish it. During WWII, it allied with Hitler’s Nazis and executed many Russian civilians and partisans in the region. Upon its reintegration into the Soviet Union, extensive deportations and ethnic cleansings were carried out again by Stalin as revenge. Under Khrushchev, it gained new territories and an elevated position among the Soviet Republics. After the fall of the Soviet system, it adopted a rather anti-Russian stance. When Russia regained part of its former strength, it imposed a pro-Russian regime there, and after the “Orange Revolution” of 2014, Ukraine again turned against Russia, which in turn seized parts of its territory. History shows that Ukraine remains anti-Russian whenever given the opportunity. There therefore appears to be credibility—a consistency—in its commitment, which may not change even in the face of the enormous destruction it has suffered. Still, it must be acknowledged that a major characterological or systemic change can occur only through an equally powerful and decisive experience. Might the mass casualties on the Ukrainian front constitute such an experience?[7] This could only become evident after the fall of the Zelensky regime…

Within this context, Russia likely realizes that the occupation of areas west of the Dnipro River and north of the Odesa region would be nearly impossible to govern—whether by Russia or by a pro-Russian government—without the imposition of martial law and/or the ethnic cleansing of non-Russian populations. This prospect is not easily feasible and would entangle Russia either in a deadly and endless occupation reminiscent of the traumatic experience of Afghanistan, or in extremely negative international publicity that could push the Russian economy into ruin under an extremely harsh sanctions regime that might be imposed universally after a mass ethnic cleansing in northwestern Ukraine. Such a scenario seems nightmarish, as the history of foreign occupations of hostile populations has demonstrated for centuries[8].

In contrast, the occupation of the four provinces already annexed by Russia—as well as possibly Odesa or Kharkiv in due time—would be immediately feasible, since the overwhelming majority of these areas are Russian, and any ethnic cleansing would be limited enough in scope not to provoke severe international repercussions. However, given the growing nationalism in Ukraine after such a defeat, as well as the West’s instrumentalization of Ukraine to trap and exhaust Russia, the conflict is likely to develop into a “frozen conflict” that will last indefinitely. Under this light, Russia’s slow advance in a prolonged war of attrition becomes understandable: it inflicts enormous losses on Ukraine’s human resources and eliminates all its experienced soldiers. The aftermath of the frozen war will find Ukraine incapable of threatening Russia—at least for the next generation.

Although the courage and persistence of the Ukrainians are undeniably admirable, the price imposed on the Ukrainian people by the nationalists surrounding Zelensky—and by the broader West—is clearly unbearable and disproportionate.

[1] US Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, 2022

[2] Allison, R., ‘Russian Military Intervention in Ukraine 2022: Motives and Objectives’, International Affairs, 2022

[3] Kulyk, V., ‘National Identity in Ukraine: Impact of Euromaidan and the War’, Europe-Asia Studies, 2016.

[4] Pratkanis, AR (ed.), The Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress, Psychology Press, New York, 2007, 85.

[5] Pratkanis 2007, 87.

[6] Cialdini, R.B., Influence: Science and practice, 5th edn, HarperCollins, New York , 2009 

[7] Pratkanis, 2007, 94.

[8] Roy, Kaushik, Modern Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: A Global History Abingdon: Routledge, 2022