By Ioanna Theou
The Assad regime collapsed in a sudden way, yet Bashar al-Assad managed to escape with his family to Moscow.
With the fall of the Assad regime, the question of Syria’s future remains unsolved. The new regime has gained the control of Syria except from the northern part that is divided between the Turkish state and the Kurdish part as well as the south-western part that belongs to the Druzes and some parts which are occupied from Israel, Syria is far from stabilized or unified. Instead, it exists in a state with overlapping spheres of influence -Turkish, Israeli, American, Russian-, and new tensions between the regime and the ethnic/religious minorities. (1)
A post- Assad Syria triggers a major strategic realignment in the region, with far-reaching consequences for both domestic actors and international powers. The fall of the Assad regime meant the collapse of the Shiite axis of Iran- Iraq- Syria- Hezbollah, an axis that has been perceived as a strategic bloc of ‘’resistance’’ against US interests. Iran’s presence in Syria was dangerous for the American and Turkish interests, therefore it was important for the new regime to have anti-Iranian elements. Hezbollah, which has relied mainly on the Assad regime for weapons corridors and strategic equipment from Iran will be weaker. (2, 3)
Although Russia has secured long term agreement for its bases in Latakia and Tartus, the legitimacy and security of those installations can have limited power with the new regime due to arrangements with NATO- aligned powers. The perception of Russia as a guarantor of regime survival is undermined and Moscow’s broader claim to regional influence will diminish. On the other side, Western- aligned actors such as the United States, Israel and Turkey perceive the fall of Assad as a strategic opportunity. (4)
The United States with the Trump regime can resist Iranian expansion. The change after the toppling of the Assad regime was framed as a victory for the United States and NATO members. Israel, which maintains military operations over southern Syria, can deepen its engagement, particularly to protect the Druze minority and ensure the neutralization of Iranian influence. Especially in this highly unstable transitional period, Israel could seek to annex or de facto control border regions under the pretext of minority protection, an outcome that would not be unprecedented given its strategic plans regarding the Golan Heights. (5)
Turkey seems to want to expand its influence through cooperation with elements in the new government, especially Sunni Islamist factions it has previously supported. The realignment could allow Ankara to pursue its long-standing goal of neutralizing Kurdish militias along its southern border. However, this scenario has strategic risks. A weaker Syrian state could enable Kurdish groups in the northeast to push for deeper autonomy or even international recognition. Of course, a possible independent Kurdistan wasn’t a good scenario for both Erdogan and Assad, but Erdogan didn’t want Assad as well and desired his fall. The unintended consequence of an independent Kurdistan may challenge Ankara’s assumptions about the level of its influence and control over post-Assad Syria. (6)
Moreover, the political character of a new Syrian regime, especially if the radical Islamist political groups become more empowered, raises serious concerns for the country’s minorities. While groups like Hayat Tahrir al- Sham have presented themselves as ‘’reformist’’ jihadists, their past actions included human rights violations against the Alawite, Christian and Shiite communities. The absence of a strong central authority could expose minority populations to renewed cycles of violence, particularly if Western powers prioritize their geopolitical interest over humanitarian consequences. (7)
So, the fall of Assad might resolve the axis of authoritarianism issue, it may create new forms of instability, namely fragmentation, sectarianism, and competing claims to sovereignty. The risk is that this chaos will be filled not by democracy, but by radicalism, and that Western complicity, whether active or passive, could facilitate another cycle of violence. (8)
The fall of the Assad regime does not mean that Syria’s problems have ended. According to the White House “… the collapse of the Assad regime is a momentous event and a historic landmark…”, but violent regime changes pose serious risks to the cohesion of a country, creating endless conflicts and this is evident by recent events. (9)
Bibliography
(1) Peter, Beaumont, ‘’Why Syria’s fallen Dictator Bashar Assad Fled to Moscow,’’ Neue Zurcher Zeitung, (December 9,2024).
https://www.nzz.ch/english/why-syrias-fallen-dictator-bashar-assad-fled-to-moscow-ld.1862189
(2) Syria Study Group Final Report and Recommendations, Institute of Peace, (2019), pp 4-10, 12-17, 25-32, available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20191016/110096/HHRG-116-FA13-20191016-SD001.pdf
(3) Brian, Katulis, Alex, Vatanka, et al, beyond ‘’MAXIMUM PRESSURE’’ in US Policy on Iran, Middle East Institute, (2025), pp. 13-17.
(4) Adar, Sinem et al, The Fall of the Assad Regime: Regional and International Power Shifts, German Institute for International and Security affairs, (2025), pp.1-8. Available at https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2025C09_Fall_Assad_Regime.pdf
(5) Hossein, Amir Varizian and Zeyneb, Farhadi, ‘’Explaining the Fall of Assad from Iran’s Strategic Perspective’’, Institute for Security and Development Policy, (2025), available at https://www.isdp.eu/explaining-the-fall-of-assad-from-irans-strategic-perspective/
(6) Lucy, Kurtzer- Ellenbogen, ‘’What Assad’s Fall Means for Israel and its regional Relations’’, United States Institute of Peace, (2024), available at https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/12/what-assads-fall-means-israel-and-its-regional-relations
Murat, Guneylioglu, ‘’ Reconsidering Turkey’s influence on the Syrian conflict’’, RUSI, (2025), available at https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/reconsidering-turkeys-influence-syrian-conflict
(7) Danika, Newlee, ‘’Hay ‘at Tahrir al Sham (HTS): Terrorism Backgrounder’’, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), (December 3, 2018), available at https://www.csis.org/programs/former-programs/warfare-irregular-threats-and-terrorism-program-archives/terrorism-backgrounders/hayat-tahrir
(8) Raja Abdulrahim and Hwaida Saad ‘’ Who are the Syrian Rebels who Captured Aleppo and Advanced on Damascus?’’, New York Times, (December 2, 2024), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/02/world/middleeast/syria-rebels-hts-who-what.html
Kayla Koontz and Gregory Waters, ’’ Without Accountability, Syria’s Sectarian Violence Will only Worsen’’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, (June 10, 2025), available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/without-accountability-syrias-sectarian-violence-will-only-worsen
(9) Press briefings, ‘’Background Press Call on the Situation in Syria.’’, The White House, (December 9, 2024).