By George Lakasas
This paper examines the relations between Russia and Iran following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, up to 1999, assessing whether these relations constituted a genuine strategic partnership of merely an alignment of interests. It advances the hypothesis that cooperation between the two states was limited to an alignment, rather than a deeper alliance. To test the hypothesis, the study employs qualitative research methods, drawing on primary and secondary sources, such as books, academic articles and policy reports, primarily from the period under examination. The study demonstrates that both countries were undergoing significant transitional phases, during which they sought closer engagement with the United States and the broader Western community. Simultaneously, they attempted to safeguard their security against those same actors. Russia, in particular, leveraged its relationship with Iran to project influence and advance its interests in the Near Abroad, especially in competition with other regional and international actors. Ultimately, both Russia’s and Iran’s attempts at rapprochement with the West proved unsuccessful. This outcome contributed to a convergence of interests between them, leading to a pragmatic alignment aimed at protecting their respective interests.
Over the past four years, Russia’s foreign policy has experienced major strategic setbacks, that have echoed across multiple global theaters. Moscow’s military invasion of Ukraine, initiated in 2022, has exposed the limits of Russian power projection, resulting in strategic attrition and significant human and material losses. In parallel, Russia’s ability to sustain and expand its network of international partnerships has weakened, prompting questions about the durability and coherence of its geopolitical outreach beyond its immediate periphery.
In December of 2024, the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad was overthrown, with the new government being welcomed by to the international community, the U.S. first and foremost, and then the Arab world, a significant shift in the balance of power. Once a lynchpin of Moscow’s Middle East strategy, the regime change has eroded Russian influence in the region and geostrategic depth.
In January of 2026, the President of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro, a close partner of Moscow was removed from office after an American operation, that resulted in his kidnapping and arrest, undermining Russia’s standing in the country.
Concurrently, Iran, a key partner of Russia, faces its own set of vulnerabilities. In 2024, Iran was bombarded by Israel, and due to the collapse of the Assad regime, lost one of its most important allies in the Middle East, that effectively connected the country to Hezbollah of Lebanon, another close ally. In 2025, Israel and the U.S. carried out airstrikes across the country, damaged its nuclear facilities and assassinated various military leaders. The most recent developments have Iran under the threat of an American invasion. Russia has been accused by analysts that is not sufficiently supporting Iran against U.S.’ threats1.
It is important to look at the relations between Russia and Iran in their recent past, most specifically during the formative pre-Putin era, in order to understand why Moscow chooses a cautious approach towards Tehran in the midst of American hostility, and whether this was true for the period under examination. Patterns can arise that could help answer this question.
The foreign policies of both Moscow and Tehran have been shaped by periods of isolation by the West, since 2022 and 1979 respectively. Against this backdrop, this research paper examines the origins, evolution and durability of the relations between the two countries, from 1992-1999. Specifically, it examines whether the bilateral relationship was driven predominantly by an alignment of interests during that formative decade.
This study adopts a qualitative approach and hypothesizes that their relations were fundamentally an interest-based alignment, rather than a partnership rooted in ideological or deep institutional similarities. By illuminating an understudied period in the Russo-Iranian relations, this paper contributes to international relations theory on the subject of alliance formation, as well as to the historical understanding of the two states whose global roles have been subjects of intense scholarly and policy interests.
Following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, among the new states the Russian Federation became its successor. Russia saw itself in a catastrophic place. Lands it once controlled were lost and its economy had to transform from socialism to capitalism. The poverty rates of the ‘90s and ‘00s, the incompetent politicians, the criminal activities of minority groups, the Chechen Wars, the Russian Orthodox Church regaining massive powers, the alcohol and drug addiction endemics of the ‘90s, and the lack of social and national direction made Russia a dystopian place. This meant that the new Russian state prioritized the stabilization and reconstruction of its domestic political, economic and social conditions2.
The hard imperial work that was put at keeping at bay the former SSRs was lost as the new republics were distancing themselves from Moscow3, thus creating a power vacuum in its former sovereignty. Places such as Eastern Europe quickly joined the Western armada, while places such as the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia became ambiguous. Russia feared that in those regions other countries could fill these vacuums, and one of them was the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran was privileged as it had a stable government and the geostrategic space to deepen its ties with the aforementioned places, mainly in Tajikistan and the Caucasus4. The significance of Tehran for Russia was not affected to a great level due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to analyst Anna Borshchevskaya5.
The history of the two states’ relations goes way back in time. Both had and have aspirations for reaching the status of regional and then great powers. This aspect of their foreign policy has resulted in the breakout of numerous conflicts, numerous times between them. It is generally assumed that relations between them were “friendly” and operated based on commerce prior to 1720. This changed when Russia invaded Iran that same year6. The reason for its invasion was the southern expansion into the Caucasus region, the primary area of their interests clashing up. In the ensuing centuries, Russia went on to fully embrace its imperialist doctrine and treated Iran accordingly. When the Soviet Union came into the picture, Iran sided with the anti-communist block and was part of the U.S.’ containment strategy for a significant part of the Cold War (1945-1979). The U.S.S.R. was the main adversary of Iran and a threat to its existence7. During those years and especially after 1971, the U.S. placed the Imperial Iran as a “regional balancer” to the pro-Soviet Arab states8. Their relations were transformed once more with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. The Soviet Union quickly recognized the regime9. Although, the Soviet Union supported Iraq during its war with Iran (1980-88), the relations did not freeze but were steadily positive10.
Interestingly enough, the then Supreme Leader of Iran, Ruhollah Khomeini, had somewhat tried to prevent the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in his own way (paralleling the Russian myth of religious missionaries arriving to Vladimir the Great to present their religions and for him to choose which to convert to), when in 1989 he sent a letter to the General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, stating that Shi’a Islam should be adopted by the Soviets in order for the state to survive11.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought a new era to their relations. This new era continues to this day. Russia has to balance between the U.S., the Arab world, Germany, the other great powers and Israel when conducting relations with Iran. On the other hand, Iran, is stuck. The international sanctions against it and the Arab hostility have placed it in a unique situation, where the Eastern world is a more suitable ground for diplomatic endeavors.
According to analysts, Dmitri Trenin and Alexey Malashenko, Russia’s relations with Iran are complex and not as plain as simple as many would think in the Western world12, while analyst Eric D. Moore would agree with this statement, as he himself has noticed a certain perplexity13. Analyst Adam Tarock, describes the relationship between Moscow and Tehran as a “strategic alliance”, based on the mutual distrust and adversity towards the United States14. The two countries have asymmetrical power in the Caspian region and in the Russian “Near Abroad”, something that analyst Clément Therme also recognizes15. Tehran is “freer” than most other states in the region and has aspirations to become a regional power. Moscow, in regard to its relations with Iran, has to evaluate its strategy based on how the United States, Israel, other nuclear powers, Germany and the Arab world would react. Simultaneously, the factor that is Turkey has entered into the mix recently16. After the collapse, Russia wanted to challenge the dominance of the U.S. and this policy against the U.S. hides behind the Russian need for global recognition. Iran strives to achieve the status of regional hegemon, according to analyst Matthew D. Crosston and highlights that it is a mistake to forget that they are located in the highly competitive place of their geostrategic interest that is the Wider Middle East17. During the examined period, Tehran, according to Therme, was modifying and adjusting its relations with Moscow, based on the status of the Moscow-Washington ones18. Lastly, Russia treats Iran differently than smaller countries in its Near Abroad for instance, based on a carefully constructed hierarchy19. Iran is an “agenda-receiver”. That means that it is passively accepting Russia’s agenda and role as a global power20 and Moscow does not consider it as a threat.
The period between 1992-1999 is of great importance, as it saw both countries seeking to approach the West and both failing.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the legal successor-state, the Russian Federation, saw itself in a strange and problematic position. On the one hand it had lost its social and geopolitical identity21, and second of all it was not capable of autonomously formulating its foreign policy22, and at the time, it was giving the impression that it had no consistency or rationale23,24,25 as a result of Yeltsin’s own inability to govern26. Its number one objective was to make sure that its sense of insecurity in regard to its sovereignty was amended27.
Concurrently Iran, since the death of its Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, was facing challenges and questions about the direction its foreign policy should take. As Dr. Maaike Warnaar has noted, the shaping of Iran’s foreign policy is a tough process among various domestic actors, in which compromise is needed, before the final policy recommendation reaches the Supreme Leader28. In both countries, new leadership took over, coincidentally sharing the same goal: approaching the West, especially the unipolar hegemon, the United States. Nevertheless, this fact did not imply the complete cutting of their bilateral relations. Trade of military equipment was something vital that Tehran wanted to continue conducting with the new Russian state, as it did with the Soviet before29. In the early 1990’s, Tehran chose to approach its neighbors in a friendly and reconciliatory manner30, with its foreign policy focusing more on the economic benefits, rather than ideological exportation31. This means that clashing with Russia in its “Near Abroad” was off the table as an option.
In Russia, a weak, kakistocratic-kleptocratic regime assumed power, that of Boris Yeltsin’s, that resulted in a cycle of unproductivity and ambiguity for the Russian foreign policy32. Russia, contrary to some existing narratives, was authoritarian under Yeltsin and that authoritarianism stemmed from the continuation of the Soviet-style political perception of checks and balances, or rather the absence of them. That same time an approachment with the U.S. was on the table33,34. In the words of Andrei Kozyrev, the first Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia, “[Russia wants to develop] a strategic partnership and alliance based on common values with the United States.”35. Russia needed the U.S.’ and the West’s investment and financial power, as it was battling to re-organize and reform its economy36, in order to get access to further Western monetary assistance37. These types of plans did not come out of the blue, as the West, especially the U.S., was encouraging Moscow to move away from its Cold War role as the opposite of Washington D.C. Initiatives and confidence were given by the West towards Russia, such as the integration of its economy into the neoliberal global one and the support they provided to Yeltsin during the 1993 constitutional crisis38.
Inside the foreign affairs apparatus there were at the time three major forces: (a) the Atlanticists, who were calling for further cooperation with the U.S. and the West, while also integrating in the world economic order, (b) the Eurasianists, that were focused on reviving Russia’s strong influence across the globe, and (c) the Chauvinists or the “Red-Brown alliance”39, that were a mix of ultra right-wing and ultra left-wing politicians calling for a more extreme version of the Eurasianists’ ideas40,41. Eventually, the Atlanticists lost influence and capital to the Eurasianists, with their era of control ending officially in 1996 with the selection of Yevgeny Primakov as Minister of Foreign Affairs42. During the phase of the Atlanticists-controlled Ministry of Foreign Affairs, their approachment did not mean that they would not make efforts to support anti-American regimes, such as that of Iran, primarily and most importantly via arms trade43,44 to signify Russia’s independent foreign policy45. But the line was set at that point and not further, as Moscow was reluctant to further approach Tehran, due to the hostility between the Arab rich countries and Iran. Also, Moscow was willing in the early ‘90s to give up its arms trade with Iran, in favor of fostering better relations with the U.S. and the West46. This somewhat changed after 199747, when, for instance, the Russian energy giant, Gazprom, made an agreement with Tehran to provide help developing its gas fields48.
In Iran, on the contrary, the new leadership under the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Akbar H. Rafsanjani, was more capable of implementing independent and strong foreign policy. Iran’s grand strategy was and is to secure the Persian Gulf as a backyard for the regime. The ideology of the leadership at the time is characterized as “pragmatic realist”49,50. In general, it is hypothesized that there were three powerful movements when it comes to influencing the Iranian domestic and foreign policies after the death of Khomeini: (a) reformists, (b) conservatives-both characterized as “realists”, both wanting to see improvements in the economic sector and to approach the U.S.-and (c) neo-conservatives, which were hardliners, supporters of Khomeini’s anti-Americanism and his Islamic viewpoint on foreign policy. It has to be stated, although, that just like in all types of regimes, but especially in the authoritarian ones, all movements have used foreign affairs as a means for domestic consumption. Nevertheless, just like Russia at the time, the approachment with the U.S. and the West was primarily for economic reasons, as the interests of both when it comes to security clash. President Mohammad Khatami made more serious efforts to approach the U.S., but they were futile and rejected by the American governments, resulting in the slow loss of power reformists had. The reason the U.S. did not accept this rapprochement was because of the lack of trust towards Tehran51.
Simultaneously, Moscow was quickly realizing that the U.S. would not respect its red lines. Although, according to professor Vladislav Zubok, the West was keen on approaching Russia and integrating it in its world system52, it became clearer with the enlargements of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1999 and 2004 into former Warsaw Pact territory and in Russia’s Near Abroad that the West and the U.S. was not keen on treating Moscow as an equal partner. Also, the Yugoslav Wars only furthered the growing distrust inside the Kremlin towards the West. During this time, the ideas of now appointed Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and philosopher Aleksandr Dugin gained ground, that of neo-Eurasianism. In essence, they called for a pivot to Asia and the creation of a different national identity, that characterized Russians are neither European nor Asians53. Neo-Eurasianism is one of the many ideologies that appeared after the collapse of 1991 and aimed at filling the nation’s ideological vacuum that existed, and focused on the importance of the Russian culture and people as the leaders of the “Eurasian people” (the masses of the former U.S.S.R. and Mongolia)54,55. The Primakov Doctrine was thus created, one that called for Russia to regain its lost standpoint in the world, oust the U.S. from former Soviet land and Eurasia, and control its former Eurasian land56. In this view, Iran was selected to play a role of counterbalancing Turkey, which at the time, was believed by Moscow to be supportive towards many secessionist movements inside Russian sovereignty and feared of potential Turkish influence expansion due to that fact57.
Concurrently, the Western world placed Turkey against Iran on exporting its secular doctrine to other countries in the Wider Middle East, including ex-Soviet republics58,59. The rivalry between Tehran and Anakary predates the dissolution of the Soviet Union60. Tehran invested on its soft power, meaning in this case “intrareligious dialogue” with the newly established Central Asian states, as a way to direct them away from focusing on nationalism. This, of course, was an opportunity and was hiding the desire of “Persianizing” them as well, through the promotion of the Persian language and culture. The initiative ultimately did not come into fruition, losing ground to Turkey61.
After 1996, Primakov envisioned Iran as a junior partner that, thanks to its geostrategic location, could kick out of the Persian Gulf the Americans62,63. Although, these were just philosophical and ideological opinions, and it appears that Russia during that period did not actively pursue such policy.
Other bilateral issues between Russia and Iran during this phase were the legal status and control of the Caspian Sea and its resources64. The Yeltsin administration, in the early ‘90s, opted to move on with policies that would make the surrounding areas of the Caspian, Russian influenced and controlled to a certain extend. Remarkable is the fact that from these plans the Iranian coastline was not included as part of Russia’s zone. Oil and natural gas were an area of cooperation for both65.
Another issue was over the Iranian promotion of Islam in Central Asia66 and South Caucasus67,68. Tehran was the most interested in these new republics in Central Asia and quickly began a process of fostering good relations with them on the basis of trade, not religion69. Iran was especially interested in these republics due to its sense of isolation in the area, by its rival Arab countries70, and had little to do with antagonizing Russia. Iran’s interests, also, aligned with those of Russia’s during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-94), as both supported Armenia over Azerbaijan. Furthermore, common understanding developed between Tehran and Moscow during the separatist wars in Chechnya, due to the first’s own fears of mitigation of those types of ideas domestically. Also, Iran downplayed the violence that Russia was committing in Chechnya, to keep their relations on a positive scale71,72. Russia has rewarded Tehran for its friendly behavior by evading the U.S.-led imposed sanctions against it and invested in the development of its nuclear program73.
Afterall, Russia wanted to remind to the world of its status as a global power through the projection of its nuclear capabilities and arsenal74. This investment did not happen without its doubts, as a destabilized nuclear Iran would be a threat to Moscow’s security, meaning it might have not been with the intentions of actually completing it75. According to analyst Nikolay Kozhanov, Iran armed with a nuclear bomb was not desirable by Moscow, as this would change the balance of power in the region and encourage others such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, or even less stable Middle Eastern states to aspire to join the nuclear bomb elite76. This is a stark contrast to the times when Iran had friendly relations with the United States. In the 1970s, Washington D.C. was quite aware of Iran’s nuclear aspirations and had made a deal with the Shah, to essentially for him stand by and wait for U.S.’ approval to enrich uranium77.
Lastly, regional civil conflicts were also on the agenda. After the war with Iraq, Iran had limited abilities to engage in foreign conflicts. In the case of Tajikistan, for example, both Russia and Iran, although believing they have the right to influence the country, chose cooperation over confrontation, by supporting the same side against the insurgents78. The fate of the civil war-torn Afghanistan was also of general concern, and Iran seemed to be sharing the fears of Moscow. Russia utilized that fact to advance its agenda in Afghanistan without Tehran’s resistance79.
In summary, Russia during the examined period had too much space and little time to cover a vast number of issues, resulting in an alignment with Tehran, and not a deepening of their relations. Moscow was focused on primarily fixing its relations with the West (U.S. & E.U.), then with its fellow ex-Soviet republics, which had begun distancing themselves from their former oppressor, while also trying to fix the domestic problems of Russia, leaving little room for its foreign policy to nurture relations with other countries, such as Iran. From the information presented, there are two key findings: a. The Russian foreign policy was not interested in Iran as much as Iran was interested in Russia during the examined period of 1992-1999, and b. their relations were an alignment of interests and nothing more or less. Iran might have been eager to cooperate with Russia further, but Moscow was concerned with other items and issues. Still, more questions remain, such as the extent of the energy cooperation between them, the level of understanding or how did other countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Israel reacted to this alignment. From the research conducted for the writing of this paper it became apparent to the researcher that there is a significant gap and lack of “enthusiasm” regarding the Iranian foreign policy, in contrast to the Russian, with whatever this entails.
The Russo-Iranian relations seem to be entering a new phase. With the return of Donald Trump to the White House, his vigorous attempts at reapproaching Russia and the 2025 coordinated Israeli-American attacks on Iran, it is left to the future to tell how the relations for the two actors will be shaped.
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41 According to lecturer Rick Fawn and professor Alexander Sergunin, the main rivalry was between the Atlanticists and the Eurasianists as a continuation of a previous ideological struggle between the Pro-Westerners and the Slavophiles during the Russian Empire, from the reign of Peter the Great until the Russian Civil War.
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